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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles: Negligence: Wartime share-the-ride program: Liability
of car owner to paying occupants under guest statutes.-Plaintiff and the
two defendants, all fellow employees, in order to qualify as a riding group in
accordance with government regulations, entered into a written contract
whereby plaintiff agreed to transport the defendants in his car at least four
days each week between their homes and their place of employment, in consideration for twenty cents a day from each of the defendants as a proportionate
share of the fuel cost. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment as to his legal
liability to the two defendants. The trial court1 adjudged the defendants to
be guests under the Ohio Guest Statute, 2 thereby relieving the plaintiff from
liability for all but willful negligence. The court of appeals in a per curiarn
opinion affirmed. 3 On final appeal, the supreme court unanimously reversed,
holding the defendants to be passengers and ,thereby subjecting the plaintiff
to liability for ordinary negligence. Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 48
N. E. (2d) 217 (1943).
The supreme court strictly construed the statute without regard for the
effect of the decision upon the war effort and the wisdom of the statute under
wartime conditions. Finding a specific contract for transportation, with the
terms of payment expressly stipulated, and further finding the arrangement
between the parties to have a business aspect, with tangible benefits conferred
upon the car owner as a result of the transportation, the court felt compelled
to conclude as it did.
Although the principal case seems to be the first reported decision on the
subject of wartime riding groups, the conclusion reached is supported by
an unbroken line, of pre-war authorities applying guest statutes to sharethe-ride arrangements. Of course, the wartime riding group has sprung
from rationing of tires, automobiles, and gasoline, 4 and the government requirement that applicants for extra rations establish their participation in
bona fide riding groups ;5 but basically the -wartimeriding, group is "on all
fours" with the old share-the-expense arrangements, or "contribution plans,"
under which occupants contributed towards the expense of the trip in
return for the ride.
19
Ohio Supp. 209 (1942).
2
OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 6308-6. It provides as follows:
. "The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle

shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or 'death of a guest

while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle,
resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the
willful or wantdn misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the
operation of said motor vehicle."
N. E. (2d) 243 (1942).
347
4
Rationing Order No. 1, 7 FED. REG. 72 (1942); Rationing Order No. 2, 7 FED. REG.
667 (1942) ; Rationing Order No. 5A, 7 FED. REG. 5225 (1942).
5Rationing Order No. 5A, § 1394.504, 7 FED. REG. 5229 (1942). For definition of

"riding group," see Amendment No. 16 to Revised Tire Rationing Regulations § 1315.504
(a) (7), 7

FED. REG.

4617 (1942).
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Directly in point is a plethora of cases on pre-war contribution plans.6
Ohio itself, the forum of the Fairley case, only a few years ago decided a
case 7 so similar to the principal case that the decision reached there could
have been controlling in the present case. The court there held the occupant
to be unquestionably a passenger, expressly ruling him out of the guest
statute. In the Fairley case the court was of the opinion that the only
case in apparent coriflict with the holding of the principal case was Everett
v. Burg.8 It is submitted that the Ohio court was being unduly cautious.
The Everett case, a Michigan decision, is clearly distinguishable from
the principal case, dealing not with a contribution plan, but with a socalled "rotation plan," whereby the group of car owners take turns driving each other to work in their respective cars. An examination of the
prior Michigan cases dealing with contribution plans, none of which was expressly or otherwise reversed by the Everett case, resolves any doubt as to
whether Michigan will reach the result of the principal case.9 It seems clear
that it will.
In deciding the status of occupants in a share-the-ride plan, a court has
three common law theories from which to choose: joint adventurers, passenger-carrier, and guest-host. Most recent writers agree that the occupant is
not a "joint adventurer."' 0 The general definition of a joint enterprise requires that there be (1) a common interest or purpose, and (2) an equal
right to control the movements and be heard in the management of the enterprise." A common interest alone is not enough.12 The important element
6
Dougherty, Adm'r, v. Hall, 70 Ohio App. 163, 45 N. E. (2d) 608 (1941), cert. den.
by Ohio Supreme Court, Jan. 14, 1942 (No. 28926) ; Kelley v. Simontis, 90 N. H. 87,
4 A. (2d) 868 (1939); Lewis v. Bertero, 194 Wash. 186, 77 P. (2d) 786 (1938);
Johnson v. Mack, 263 Mich. 10,, 248 N. W. 534 (1933). See also Note (1942) 17
'TEMP. L. Q. 77 for reference to a recent unreported California case, Barnes v. Danielson,
which held occupants of a car driven under the government sponsored share-the-ride program to be passengers.
7
Dougherty, Adm'r, v. Hall, 70 Ohio App. 163, 45 N. E. (2d) 608 (1941).
8301 Mich. 734, 4 N. W. (2d) 63 (1942). This case involves six fellow employees who
entered a plan to provide daily transportation to and from their place of employment; five
of them owned cars, in the use of which they alternated each week, while the sixth agreed
to pay the driver, whoever he might be, seventy-five cents per week. The suit is betwo of the car owners, and does not involve the one who paid for his transportation.
tween
9
lohnson v. Mack, 263 Mich. 10, 248 N. W..534 (1933), with facts similar to those in
the Fairley case, held that a passenger-for-hire status was thereby created. Then, in
Bustonse v. Brom, 297 Mich. 616, 298 N. W. 303 (1941), decided one year prior to the
Everett case by the very same court with but one change in personnel, the court said
at page 624, 298 N. W. at 304, as if it had in mind the very facts of the Fairley case:
"In general terms, it may be said of the Michigan [guest] statute that if there is a contract to transport one by automobile, and if the owner or driver of the automobile
receives pecuniary benefit as the consideration for such transportation, then the one so
is not a guest passenger."
transported
' 0 See Meyer, Tort Liability Under the Wartime Car Sharing Plan (1942) 11 GEO.
WAsHi. L. Rlv. 1, 12; Notes (1943) 31 GEo. L. J. 187; (1942) 17 TEmp. L. Q. 77. For
a general discussion of the applicability of the joint-enterprise doctrine to car-sharing
plans, see Miller, Car-SharingPlais and the Joint-Enterprise Doctrine (1943) 2 LOYoLA
L. REv. 29.
"tSeeMork v. Caslov, 327 Pa. 298, 192 Atl. 903 (1937) ; Hughes v. Baker, 169 Okla.
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of joint control would appear to be lacking from a share-the-ride arrangement; for, although the members may jointly prearrange the route to be
followed, this in itself is not considered a sufficient manifestation of joint
control, since the members exercise no further cbntrol over the operation
of the automobile.' 3
An occupant is generally held to be a "passenger" when he has given consideration for his transportation, 1 4 which was determined by prior agreement 15 or some fixed understanding,' 6 or which arose as a result of contractual relations existing between the parties ;17 or where the occupant
was in the car for the benefit of the car owner or the mutual benefit of both
parties.' 8 The consideration must be more than merely casual or trifling, 19
20
and must be beneficial to the owner in a tangible or material manner,
21
but it need not be cash.
The consideration may even be given by a third
party.2

2

A minority of the courts require that the parties be neither friends

nor relatives,2 and that the payment24made exceed the occupant's proportiQnate share of the expenses of the trip.
A "guest" is held to be one who, upon express or implied invitation by
the owner or driver, rides in a car without making any return to, or conferring any benefit upon, the owner or driver.2 5 However, even the conferring of a benefit by sharing expenses with the owner has been held not to
remove a person from the legal status of guest, where the trip is predominantly of a social nature.2 6
From the above discussion it would appear that when there is a sharing
320, 35 P. (2d) 926 (1934). Some cases tend to emphasize the control feature. Rodgers
v. 2Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 AtI. 166 (1931).
1 Koplitz v. City of St. Paul, 86 Minn. 373, 90 N. W. 794 (1902).
3
1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)
§ 491, comment e; Everett v. Berg, 301 Mich. 734,
4 N. W. (2d) 63 (1942) ; Fisher v. Johnson, 238 Ill. App. 25 (1925). But cf. Derrick v.

Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co., 50 Utah 573, 168 Pac. 335 (1917); see

RESTATEMENT, TORTS

(1934) § 491, comments c and g for suggestion that a mutual determination of the route
together with a sharing of expenses constitutes enough evidence for submission to the
jury of the question as to whether there was a joint enterprise. As a .matter of practical concern, even if the arrangement is held to be a joint enterprise, this is of no
importance in suits between members of a joint enterprise since the doctrine of imputed negligence does not apply in suits inter sese. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 491,

comment
b;
4

HARPER, TORTS

(1933) § 148.

' Carey v. City of Oakland, 44 Cal. App. (2d) 503, 112 P. (2d) 714 (1941).
156 Note (1939) -11 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 131, 132.
1 Smith v. Clute, 277 N. Y. 407, 14 N. E. (2d) 455 (1938).
' T8 Brown v. Branch, 175 Va. 382,,9 S. E. (2d) 285 (1940).
' Bree v. Lamb, 120 Conn. 1, 178 Atl. 919 (1935).
0
'20
Everett v. Burg, 301 Mich..734, 4 N. W. (2d) 63 (1942).
Bookhart v. Greenlease-Lied Motor Co., 215 Iowa 8, 244 N. W. 721 (1932).
21
22 Peccolo v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. (2d) 532, 66 P. (2d) 651 (1937).
Smith v. Fall River School Dist., 118 Cal. App. 673, 5 P. (2d) 930 (1931).
23
Orcutt v. Erie Indemnity Co., 114 Pa. 493, 174 Atl. 625 (1937).
24
Meyers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co., 99 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
25
Dorn v. Village of North Olmstead, 133 Ohio St. 375, 14 N. E. (2d) 11 (1938);
Smith
v. Clute, 277 N. Y. 407, 14 N. E. (2d) 455 (1938).
26
McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. (2d) 279, 70 P. (2d) 909 (1937).
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of expenses, the occupant's status may be determined by the nature of the
trip--that is, whether the trip has a social or business aspect-provided
the court can readily decide the nature of the trip. One would expect to
encounter little difficulty in distinguishing between a social trip taken by
intimate friends in the pursuit of pleasure and in the spirit of hospitality and
friendship, and a business trip primarily motivated by business necessity with
the transportation and compensation therefor prearranged by contractual
agreement. The relation between the parties, the object of the trip, the
formality of the arrangements, the form of the agreement as to payment, the
consistency of the trips-that is, whether one isolated trip or a series of trips
is contemplated-are all indicia of the nature of the trip.27 Yet, at least one
court was unable to distinguish between a social and a business trip. 28
To obviate. the necessity of making this distinction, courts recently have
developed the now thoroughly accepted working proposition that, regardless
of the nature of the trip-be it for pleasure or business-where there is a
prior legally enforceable agreement to share expenses, as contrasted with a
mere voluntary payment made without any pre-existing agreement or understanding, the occupant will be held to be a passenger, not a guest." Upon
analysis all the cases on the subject of ride-sharing can be reconciled under
this proposition. 30
In view of the foregoing summary of the applicable law, the defendants
in the principal case clearly should not be called guests. Even omitting from
consideration the obvious business nature of the trip, under the foregoing
rule the occupants are passengers because of the prior enforceable agreement providing for the transportation.
Having no legal justification for calling the defendants guests, why, then,
should a court extend the guest statute so as to include these wartime sharethe-ride occupants? The trial court in the principal case offered two reasons:
(1) to reward for his patriotism the car owner, who uses his car in a government urged ride-sharing plan, by minimizing his liability to the persons
riding with him; (2) to further the war effort by encouraging car owners
to participate in ride-sharing plans, thereby providing vital transportation for
war workers, and at the same time conserving gasoline, oil, and rubber.
Understandable as were the ,trial court's motives, it is submitted that the
court was not justified in trying to reconcile the law it wished to write with
the law as it is. The universal policy behind the adoption of the guest statutes
was to cut off the legal rights of the gratuitous guest against "the hand that
feeds him" unless the host has been so willfully or grossly neglectful of the
27

Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 337, 48 N. E. (2d) 217, 222, (1943).
v. Fairley, 9 Ohio Supp. 209 (1942).
Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N. E. (2d) 140 (1942) ; Smith v. Clute,
277 N. Y. 407, 14 N. E. (2d) 455 (1938); Kerstetter v. Elfman, 327 Pa. 17, 192 Atl.
6630 (1937). See also cases from other jurisdictions cited in these three cases.
S See note 29 supra. Under this proposition the' New York court in S.inith v. Clute,
277 N. Y. 407, 14 N. E. (2d) 455 (1938), reconciled the otherwise inexplicably contrary Ohio cases of Beer v. Beer, 134 Ohio St. 271, 16 N. E. (2d) 413 (1938) and
Ernest v. Bel'i~lle, 53 Ohio App. 110, 4 N. E. (2d) 286 (1936).
28
Miller
29
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guest's safety that the guest owes him no'gratitude.3 ' Rewards for patriotic
drivers and furtherance of the war effort were clearly not within the contemplation of the guest statutes. Being in derogation of the common law,
the guest statutes are strictly construed. 32 The public policy that stood
behind the protection of automobile occupants from ordinary negligence in
peacetime is as prevalent in wartime. As stated by the supreme court in the
Fairley case, "It is just as important to the war effort to provide security for
the worker who is injured ... from the negligent acts of the motorist transporting him to and from his place of employment, as it is to conserve the
tires of the vehicle in which he is transported. '3 3 If, after a balancing of
public policy considerations, it is thought to be more in the public interest
in wartime to help the patriotic driver at the expense of the innocent passenger, this is for the legislature to enact, not for the courts to provide.
It is submitted that by refusing to call the occupants in a share-the-ride
plan guests and thereby denying to the patriotic car owner the immunity to
liability conferred by some twenty states having guest statutes, 4 no undue
additional hardship is inflicted upon the car owner: (1) the standard automobile liability insurance policy now covers the insured for transportation
under share-the-ride plans; (2)- statutes specially applicable to carriers of
passengers for hire do not apply to car owners in ride-sharing plans.
Although prior to the war the standard automobile insurance policy contained an exclusion clause, exempting the insurance company from liability
to the insured "where the automobile is used . . . for carrying persons for a
charge,"3 5 now practically all the insurance companies of the nation, at the
request of the Office of Price Administration, have agreed either to construe
all policies written by them so as not to preclude coverage in the event the
affected vehicle is being operated in connection with wartime ride-sharing
plans sponsored by any federal or state agency,3 6 or to strike out of the
standard policy the exclusion clause quoted above.3 7 Thus, determining
whether occupants in share-the-ride plans are guests or passengers is now a
matter of purely academic interest from the standpoint of insurance coverage, sate in states such as Massachusetts where payment of the minimum
premium does not secure to the insured coverage for the carrying of guests.s8
31
32 See Notes (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 390; (1933) 18 CORNELL L. Q. 621.
See Smith v. Clute,'277 N. Y. 407, 410, 14 N. E. (2d) 455, 457 (1938).
3141 Ohio St. at 338, 48 N. E. (2d) at 223 (1943).
34
See: MALCOLM, AUTOMOBILE GUEST LAw STATUTES AND DECISIONS (1937); Weber,
Guest Statutes (1937) 11 U. OF CINN. L. REv. 24; Note (1933) 18 CoRNELL L. Q. 621.
Massachusetts obtains the results of the guest statutes by common law decision. Massaletti
v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168 (1917).
35Whether
occupants who share in the expenses of the trip came within the scope of
this clause has been frequently litigated. E.g., Bertelstein v. Marks, 25 Ohio L. Abst.
117 (1937).
36(1943)
11 U. S. L. WEEx 2464.
37

The National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters, listing among its members every major carrier in New York State, has followed this latter course, directing,
its members to strike this exemption clause from their standard automobile casualty
policy.
38
Massachusetts underwriters require a premium payment of $3.00 extra to insure
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However, even if Massachusetts, contrary to its prior holdings,3 9 were to.
hold occupants such as the defendants in the principal case to be guests, the
above-mentioned agreement by insurance companies to cover the owners of
cars engaged in wartime ride-sharing plans would seem to preclude concern
about insurance coverage.- Of course, the car owner who does not carry
automobile insurance is not within these benefits. But, in view of the great
public interest against allowing financially irresponsible persons to own and
operate motor vehicles and the growing trend among the states to require insurance or' some sort of financial responsibility of all their drivers,4 ° the
uninsured car owner is not in a position to complain that the decision in the
principal case imposes undue hardship on him.
It is submitted that occupants in share-the-ride plans, although not guests
and actually paying for their transportation, are not the type of passengerfor-hire contemplated by the statutes applicable to carriers of passengers-forhire. As the New York court said, in refusing to call one who actually paid
for his transportation a passenger for hire, "Not to be a guest is not ipso
facto to be a passenger for hire."' 4 ' A brief examination of the New York
statutes, which in their regulation of carriers are fairly typical of those in
many states, 42 illustrates their inapplicability to car owners such as' the
plaintiff in the principal case. Section 17(1) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law,
like similar statutes in most states, 43 requires compulsory minimum liability
insurance for "every person, firm, association or corporation engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers for hire. . .

."

(Italics added.)

All other passenger vehicles licensed in New York, not engaged in the busiiess of transportation, come under Article 6-A (Sections 94 et Veq.) of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law, the "financial responsibility law.' 44 Whether theagainst liability to guests. The standard policy in New York, on the other hand, re-

quires
no extra premium payment for guest coverage.
39
See Haines v. Chereskie, 301 Mass.' 112, 114, 16 N. E. (2d) 680, 681 (1938) ; Foley
McDonald, 283 Mass. 96, 185 N. E. 926 (1933).
v. 40
See note 44 infra.
41
Smith v. Clute, 277 N. Y. 407, 413, 14 N. E. (2d) 455, 458 (1938) ; and see Knutson
v. 42
Lurie, 217 Iowa 192, 195, 251 N. W. 147, 149 (1933).
Regulation of carriers of passengers for hire in "guest statute" states or otherwise,
is generally limited to those carriers regularly engaged in the business of transporting
passengers. E.g., OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) §§ 614-84 to 614-120, and
comparable
legislation in Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania cited therein.
43
E.g., OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 614-99.
4
4 L. 1941, c. 872. E.g., N. H. REv. LAWS (1942) c. 122, p. 475; OHio GEN. CODE ANN.
(Page, 1938) §§ 6298-1 et seq., and similar "financial responsibility" legislation cited
therein from Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Pennsylvania,- and West Virginia.
Compare MAss. ANN. LAWS (Michie, 1933, as amended 1942 Supp.) §§ 34A-34J. For
an excellent article on the New York Act, supra, see Patterson, Required Motor Vehicle
Inumrance in New York, 18 J. Am. INS. (August, 1941) 13. The Act provides, in effect,
that after any accident resulting in death, bodily injury, or property damage exceeding
twenty-five dollars, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall suspend the operator's
license and the registration certificate of the person owning or operating any motor
vehicle involved in the accident, until such person has satisfied any judgment for damages
resulting from such accident; said owner or operator must also furnish proof of finan,cial responsibility in the future-ordinarily, insurance. ,
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share-the-ride car owners come within Section 17 or Article 6-A has not yet
been litigated; but, in view of the number of car owners who have engaged
in these riding plans, and the seeming failure of the -Public Service Commission to throw such car owners out of Article 6-A and into Section 17, it
would appear that the Commission is not construing participation in sharethe-ride plans as the equivalent of being "in the business of ...

transporting

passengers for hire." And it is clear that transportation is not the "business"
of persons such as the plaintiff, in the ordinary sense of the term.45
Certificates of public convenience and necessity by at least one state statute
are required of every car owner who carries passengers for a consideration, even
though such owner is' not in the business of carrying such passengers ;46 but
this state is apparently not enforcing the statute against participants in government sponsored share-the-ride plans.4 7 Most states limit the requirement
of obtaining these certificates to those regularly in the business of carrying
passengers-for-hire. 48 New York does not even require common carriers,
such as.taxis, or commercial contract carriers 'for hire who are regularly in
that business to have such certificates, provided their carrying capacity is
not more than seven persons. 50 New York, however, like most other states,
does require commercial vehicles carrying passengers for hire exclusively
within the'territorial limits of a municipality, and all vehicles which compete
with such commercial vehicles to obtain the consent of the local authorities
and comply with relevant city ordinances in the places where they choose to
operate, if the local authorities so require. 51 But it has been held in a New
York case comparable to the Fairley case, that a person who makes a
business arrangement with seven individuals to transport them to and from
their place of employment daily at a specified weekly rate is not within the
scope of these requirements.5 2 In view of the dearth of litigation on the
applicability of statutes regulating carriers of passengers for hire to share45

For same interpretation of 'similar words in Federal Motor Carrier Act, see Martin

v. United States, 100 F. (2d) 490, 494 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938), cert. den. 306 U. S. 649,
59 Sup. Ct. 590 (1938).
46MD. CODE ANN. (Flack's ed. 1939) Art. 56, § 296 (requiring owners of passenger
cars transporting passengers under share-the-ride plan to obtain certificates of public convenience
and necessity).
47
See Meyer, op. cit. supra note 10, at 2.
4
8E.g., OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) §§ 614-87, 614-88, 614-115, and comparable legislation from other jurisdictions cited id. at Vol. I, p. 323.
49For definition of contract carrier for hire, see Wagner, Common, Contract and Private Motor CarriersDefined and Distinguished (1941) 9 I. C. C. PRAcr. J. 119.
50
N. Y. PuB. SEmv. LAW § 60. It has been held that Section 65 of the Transportation
Corporations Law, requiring vehicles which carry passengers for hire to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity, must be read in connection with Section 60
of the Public Service Law, which limits its scope to "omnibuses with a carrying
capacity of more than seven persons." People v. Verro, 162 Misc. 313, 295 N. Y. Supp.
313 (Co. Ct. 1937); People v. Archinofsky, 157 Misc. 587, 284 N. Y. Supp. 516 (Ct.
Spec. Sess., Kings County, 1935).

*51
52N. Y.

TRANSPORTATION CORPORATIONS LAW

§ 66.

Utica-Clayville Bus Co. v. Waite, 233 App. Div. 297, 252 N. Y. Supp. 673
(4th Dep't. 1931).
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it seems reasonable to infer that the state and local authori-

ties have not been inclined to so apply these statutes.
In the event that the owner crosses a state line in traveling to his place
of employment, is he within the scope of the. Federal Motor Carrier Act of
1935 ?5- Although the Act includes within its scope "contract carriers," 55 it
expressly limits its application to those "engagtd in transportation by motor
vehicle as a regular occupation or business,"5 6 which provision seems 57to
exclude share-the-ride arrangements from the sphere of federal regulation.
All things considered, a car owner in a share-the-ride plan has little to
fear from the inadequacy of his automobile insurance or the application of
statutes regulating carriers of passengers for hire, even though the occupants
of his car be classified as passengers, as the great weight of authority construing guest statutes indicates they must be. Further, the cautious car
owner may be able to obtain from the occupants a valid release from liability
for his, acts of ordinary negligence. 5s Therefore, no undue hardship is suffered by the patriotic ride-sharing car owner as a result of his co-operation
with the government and the war effort. In view of this, the court clearly
reached the correct result in not extending the guest statute to decide the
principal case.
Alvin D. Lurie

Bailments: Public service: Master and servant: Liability of garagekeeper for wrongful act of servant outside scope of employment.-In
Castorinav.Rose, 290 N. Y. 445, 49 N. E. (2d) 521 (1943), a garageman's
employee acting outside the scope of employment wrecked an automobile
bailed with the garagekeeper. At the trial, the garageman brought forward
evidence tending to show that he had used due care in the choice of the
53
For the only case in point found, see Towers v. Wildason, 135 Md. 677, 109 At.
471 (1920) where an automobile owner who used his car to transport himself and five"
others to and from work for a stipulated compensation was not required under a former
Maryland statute to obtain a permit from the public service commission to operate a
car for the transportation of passengers for hire; see also Forsyth v. San Joaquin L. &
P. Corp., 208 Cal. 397, 281 Pac. 620 (1929). But see Kelley v. State, 197 Ark. 1175, 128
S. W. (2d) 265 (1939). For discussion of the present Maryland statute, see note 46 supra.
5449 STAT. 543-567 (1935), INTERSTATE COMMERCE AcT, PART I, §§ 201-228, 49
U. S. C. §§ 301-327 (1940). For the practical background and legislative history of the
Act, see George, The Federal Motor CarrierAct of 1935 (1936) 21 CORNELL L. Q. 249.
5549 U. S. C. § 304(2) (1940). For definition of contract carrier, see Wagner, op. cit.
supra note 49.
5649 U. S. C. § 303(b) (9) (1940).

s7Of course, for the duration of the war all owners and drivers of any sort of motor
vehicle must comply with the regulations of the Office of Defens Transportation, whose
authority as to motor vehicles has been superimposed by the president over that of any
other regulatqry body. Exec. Order No. 9156, May 2, 1942, 7 FED.REG. 3349.
5
SSee Meyer, op. cit. mupra note 10, at 19 et seq., in which the author cites "considerable authority that a release of liability for simple negligence does not contravene public
policy," and argues that the allowance of such releases is necessary to the effectuation
of the share-the-ride program.
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employee, and there was no indication that the employee had been remiss on
other occasions. The Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division, which
had affirmed a municipal court judgment against the garagekeeper. Though
it reached the same result as the trial court, the appellate division rejected the
lower court's theory that, "The rule under which common carriers are liable
for the torts of their employees should be extended to garage owners in cases
where the loss of or damage to automobiles is involved."' The Court of
Appeals agreed with the appellate division in rejecting this theory.
The municipal court must have been referring to either (1) the non-fault
liability of a common carrier of freight;2 or (2) the liability of a carrier of
passengers for the torts of carrier employees within or outside the scope of
employment.3 Under either theory, non-fault liability would have been imposed
by analogizing the garagekeeper to the common carrier. The municipal court
was probably influenced by considerations of expediency-the financial irresponsibility of garagemen's employees as contrasted with the responsibility
of the employers, and the availability of garagemen's legal liability insurance
to protect the garageman against losses caused by depredations of employees,4
thus distributing the loss among garagemen generally, and from them to the
public in the form of slightly higher charges.
One who would recognize the analogy between a common carrier and a
garageman is confronted, however, by obstacles almost insurmountable. At
common law, liability without fault is the exception rather than the rule.
Unless constrained by precedents from an earlier period or by statute, the
courts rarely will impose it. A full half-century ago, moreover, the courts
were unanimous in holding that the precursor of the garageman, the liverystable keeper, was not engaged in a common calling.5 Both grain elevators"
and wharves 7 "may be common carriers under certain circumstances and for
certain purposes, but they are not closely analogous to the garage because over
a wharf or through a grain elevator there is a flow of goods in commerce-an
element of transportation-while the garage does not handle the goods of
commerce, but only repairs or stores instrumentalities which may or may not
be used for common carriage. The courts in recent years have been unwilling
to pursue doubtful analogies in order to extend the field of common callings,
but have invoked the aid of the legislature. "Until the legislature brings a
'Castorina v. Rosen, 265 App. Div. 316, 38 N. Y. S. (2d) 753 (1st Dep't. 1942).
24 WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS (Williston and Thompson, rev. ed., 1936), §§ 1089, 1072:

"The common law made the common carrier of goods liable for damage to the goods
carried though it was .not negligent, and subject only to the excuses of act of God, act
of the country's enemy, act of law, act of the shipper, and vice of the goods." See also
§§ 3 1090-1094.
4Hayne v. Union Street Ry. Co., 189 Mass. 551, 76 N. E. 219 (1905).
1n the past, burglary, theft, and larceny policies usually excluded losses caused by
employees [VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 926], but a reliable insurance agent assures
the writer that protection can now be obtained by taking out a garageman's legal liability
policy.
54
WMLISTON, CONTRACTS (Williston and Thompson, rev. ed., 1936) § 1072 (a), n. 24.
6

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1877).
WILLiSTON, CONTRACTS (Williston and Thompson, rev. ed., 1936) § 1072 (a), n. 17.

74

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 29

business within the police power by clear intent, the courts will not do so."
The appellate division attained the same result as the municipal court, but
by a different method: by implying a term in the contract of bailment that
the garageman would not use the car and by holding that the use by his servant
.as a violation of this term though beyond the scope of the servant's authority.
Relying on well-known principles of bailment and of master and servant and
on the authority of Schmidt v. Blood,9 which held that a bailor for hire "is
only bound to take the same care of the goods as of his own, and if they be
stolen or embezzled by his servant without gross negligence on his part, he
is not liable," the Court of Appeals reversed. The decision is in accord with
the minority view.10
While the Court of Appeals failed to discuss the implied contract theory
of the appellate division, its holding must be interpreted as rejecting that
anomalous theory. It would be proper to imply a term in the contract that
the bailee would not use the bailed article because this would merely duplicate
one of the already existing relational obligations ;11 but when the appellate
division went further and implied a term making the" non-negligent bailee
liable for the act of a servant outside the scope of employment, it imposed
an obligation incidental neither to the relation of master and servant nor to
the relation of bailor and bailee. To be sure, the~parties could have contracted
for such an additional obligation, but where there is no evidence that such
was the intention of the parties, the appellate division should have assumed
that nothing more than the traditional obligations of each of the relations
involved was intended.
An application of this rule of construction would have brought the appellate
division to the sane conclusion as that reached by the Court of Appeals. 12
Applying the law of bailments, the bailee would not have been held to a
duty beyond the exercise of due care ;13 and applying the law of master and
servant, he would ndt have been liable for the act of a servant outside the
14
any more than he would have been liable for the act
scope of employment,
15
of a stranger.

It must be admitted, however, that in at least one instance the Court of
Appeals has applied the same technique as that used by the appellate division
to a case involving different facts, but the same problem. In Davidson v.
Madison Corporation,16 the plaintiff gave his baggage check to the porter of
sState v. Spokane, etc. R.R. Co., 89 Wash. 599, 605, 154 Pac. 1110, 1113 (1916). See
also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934).
99 Wend. 268 (N. Y. 1831).
' 0 Rhodes v. Warsawsky, 242 Ill. App. 101 (1926); Firemen's P'und Insurance Co. v.
Schreiber, 150 Wis. 42, 135 N. W. 507 (1912). The majority view is represented by
Maynard v. James, et al., 109 Conn. 365, 146 Ati. 641 (1926) ; Corbett v. Smeraldo, 91
N. J. L. 29, 102 Ati. 889 (1917).
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WIILLISTON, CONTRACTS

(Williston and Thompson, rev. ed., 1936) § 1035.

124 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Williston and Thbmpson,
' 3 Dietrich v. Peters, 28 Ohio App. 427, 162 N. E. 743
4

rev. ed., 1936) § 1032.
(1928).

1 Marsh v. Hard, 120 N. Y. 315, 27 N. E. 854 (1890).
15Hogan v. O'Brien, 212 App. Div. 193, 208 N. Y. Supp. 477 (3d Dep't. 1925).
16257 N. Y. 120, 177 N. E. 393 (1931).
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the defendant hotel, and the porter procured an independent contractor to
bring plaintiff's trunk from the station. The trunk was lost through the
negligence of the independent contractor. While admitting that the service
of getting trunks from the station was not one of the duties of an innkeeper,
the Court of Appeals held the defendant liable on his contract and refused
to recognize the defense that the loss was due to the negligence of the independent contractor and not to the negligence of the principal. The case could
have been used to buttress the decision of the appellate division and was
worthy of treatment by the Court of Appeals. Here the question was whether
the court should imply a term in the contract making the employer liable for
the negligence of an independent contractor, a liability not customarily incidental to the relation involved. 1 7 In the principal case, the question was
whether a term should be implied in the contract making the master liable
for the wrongful act of a servant outside the scope of employment, again a
liability not ordinarily incidental to the relation, this time of master and
servant.' 8 The same principle should have been applied to both cases: That
without evidence of the intention of the parties, the court should presurnie
that the usual incidents of the relation involved, whatever it may be, were
intended by the parties when they entered into a contract envisioning one
of the traditional relations. The reasons which might be urged for refusing to
apply this rule of construction are not convincing.
That a garagemafn's employee is in a peculiarly tempting position is not
doubted. "How oft' the sight of means to do ill deeds makes deeds ill done !"
Interested in the working of automobiles, the employee is all too apt to take
out a car to test its power and speed. To drive the car of another without
his consent amounts to larceny under Section 1293 (a) of the New York Penal
law.' 9 The statute goes far enough, and it seems neither wise nor just to set
up the unwilling garageman as a special policeman to watch over all his
employees whether on shift or off.
In Evants v. Williams and Peterson,2 0 the court had a vague feeling that
the minority rule would "put a premium on lack of personal attention." The
fear is groundless, for if the nature of the bailment requires personal attention, it would be a breach of the bailor's duty 'to delegate performance to a
third person.2 ' In the principal case, delegation is made necessary by the
"'King v. New York Central R.R. Co., 66 N. Y. 181 (1876).
'sMarsh v. Hard, 120 N. Y. 305, 27 N. E. 854 (1890).
'ON. Y. PENAL LAW § 1293 (a) : "Any person who, under circumstances
tuting larceny as defined by any other article of this article shall, without
of the owner take, use or operate, or cause to be taken, used or operated an
other aircraft or an automobile or other motor vehicle, for his owh profit, use
steals the same, is guilty of larceny and shall be punishable accordingly."

20232 Ill. App. 439 (1924).

not constithe consent
airplane or
or purpose,

21
DoBi, BAILMENTS (1st ed. 1914) § 66: "Unless the contract or the nature of the
bailment requires the personal services of the bailee, he may have the work completely
performed by third persons, or he may employ them to assist him in the undertaking."
The size and the character of the work will determine whether the performance may be
delegated. Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. v. Schreiber, 150 Wis. 42, 135 N. W. 507

(1912).
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circumstances of the business; and if necessary, the courts should not fear
to "put a premium" on it by making it legal. But what is the premium referred to? Merely that the garageman shall not be liable for the wrongful
acts of a stranger. He remains liable under the rule of respondeat superior,
and must also exercise due care in the choice of his employees, 22 and if, in the
exercise of due care, he has reason to doubt the reliability of his servant, he
will be liable for the servant's Wrongful acts affecting the bailed automobile
regardless of the rule of respondeat superior.2
Finally, it might be argued that the negligence of the garageman is peculiarly
difficult to prove because the garageman is often in possession of information
not known to the patron. A simple answer is found in the elementary rule of
evidence that once the bailor has shown failure to redeliver upon reasonable
24
demand, the bailee must go forward with the evidence and explain the failure.
None of the reasons of policy that might be advanced seems to have sufficient force to justify the action of the appellate division in attempting to
modify the law of bailments and of master and servant in cases of this sort
by injecting an unusual term into the contract.
Edward M. Smallwood
Banking: Bank's liability for misappropriation of trust funds: Civil
remedy under Section 25-a of the New York Lien Law.-In Raymond
Concrete Pile Company v. FederationBank and Trust Company,1 288 N. Y.
452, 43 N. E. (2d) 486 (1942), reaff'd, 290 N. Y. -, 48 N. E. (2d) 709
(March 4, 1943), one 0 had become indebted to the defendant bank. In
contemplation of a forthcoming warrant from the City of New York for work
upon a public improvement, 0 and the bank agreed to lump this debt into a
single demand note for $78,000. Upon receiving the warrant, 0 indorsed it
and deposited it to his personal account in the bank; the bank immediately
offset its claim against the deposit. 0 drew other checks against the deposit
before giving plaintiff a check for $80,000 for services rendered. Upon
presentation of this check for certification, the bank refused for lack of sufficient funds. Plaintiff then sued the bank in a representative action under
Section 25-a of the New York Lien Law2'to impress a trust upon the proceeds
22
Rhodes v. Warsawsky,
23
Handley v. O'Gorman,
24

242 Ill. App. 101 (1926).
45 R. I. 242, 121 Atl. 399 (1923).
Byalos v. Mateson, 328 Ill. 269, 159 N. E. 242 (1927), aff'g 243 Ill. App. 60 (1926);
judge v. Starr, 5 N. J. Misc. 283, 136 Atl. 413 (1927) ; Smith v. Economical Garage,
107 Misc. 430, 176 N. Y. Supp. 479 (App. Term, 1919) (proof that a motor car, when
delivered to a garagekeeper, was in good order, but when called for a few days later
was damaged, thd water jacket having frozen and burst, makes out a prina facie case
against the bailee, the garagekeeper).
'Rev'g 261 App. Div. 25, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 933 (1st Dep't. 1940) (Dore, J., dissenting),
rezg 174 Misc. 206, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
2N. Y. LIEN LAw, § 25-a, as amended, effective September 1, 1942, provides:
Contractor on public improvements who diverts funds guilty of larceny; civil
remedy to enforce trust. The funds received by a contractor for a public improvement are hereby declared to constitute trust funds in the hands of such contractor
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of the warrant. The bank had no knowledge that 0 had employed subcontractors in its work for the city,.
The Court of Appeals held for the defendant bank upon two grounds.
First, the court held that the statute created merely'the possibility of a fiduciary relationship, a relationship which would arise only if there were claimants
-to the funds who could not be paid from other moneys; and that as the bank
bad no knowledge or-constructive notice of the claims of subcontractors,3 it
was not chargeable with notice of, misappropriation of the funds. Secondly,
the coufrt held that Section 25-a of the Lien Law, as it existed prior to amendment in September', 1942, was purely penal in nature and did not create a
civil cause of action. 4 Under the present amendment it clearly appears that a
civil remedy and a fiduciary relationship are created.
Under the amendment, then, the case presents a problem vital in banking
transactions: the question of liability of a bank for the misappropriation by a
fiduciary of the proceeds of checks drawn or indorsed by him in his fiduciary
to be applied first to the payment of claims of subcontractors, architects, engineers,
surveyors, laborers and materialmen arising out of the improvement . . . and any

contractor and any officer, director or agent of any contractor wlo applies or con-

sents to the application of such funds for any other purpose and fails to pay the
claims hereinbefore mentioned is guilty of larceny and punishable as provided in
section thirteen hundred and two of the penal law.' Such trust may be enforced by
civil action maintained as provided in article three-a of this chapter by any person

entitled to share in the fund, whether or not he shall have filed, or had the right to

file, a notice of lien or shall have recbvered a judgment for a claim arising out of
the improvement. For the purposes of a civil action only, the trust funds include
the right of action upon an obligation for moneys due or to become due to a contractor,
as well as mn;eys actually received by him. (Italics added).
3
Citing Clark v. Public National Bank and Trust Co., 259 N. Y. 285, 181 N. E. 574
(1932).
4In granting the motion for rehearing, the Court of Appeals must either have found
that in the absence of an expression of intent by the legislature the amendment was

procedural, not substantive, and was to apply, to pending litigation; or that their view
that 25-a was purely penal in nature was incorrect. The former appears more probable.

Before the amendment to the act there were scattered decisions in the lower courts
holding that the word "trust" created a true fiduciary relationship and was not a mere
descriptive word binding the contractor. For authority that the, act created an actual
trust relationship, see:
a. When the funds were in the hands of the owner, contractor, or subcontractor:
Corbjn-Kellogg Agency v. Tasker, 248 App. Div. 58, 289 N. Y Supp. 156 (3d Dep't.
1936), rev'g 158 Misc. 394, 286 N. Y. Supp. 956 (Co. Ct. 1936); Devitt v. Schottin,
158 Misc. 230, 285 N. Y. Supp. 255, (Sup. Ct. 1936).
b. When the funds were in the hands of a representative of a statutory trustee: In re
Heintzleman, 34 F. Supp. 109 (W. D. N. Y. 1940) ; Pick v. Travis, 6 F. Supp. 486 (E. D.
N. Y. 1933). But a trust was not allowed when the claimant had not filed a lien. Wickes
Boiler Co. v. Godfrey-Keller Co., 116 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
c. When the funds reach a bona fide transferee for value, the equity is destroyed.
For a strong argument that an actual trust was created, see Grossman, Trust and Penal
Provisions of the New York State Mechanic's Lien Law (1935) 5 BROOKLYN, L. Rxv.
14, 29.

The principal authority against the creation of a trust appears in Amiesite Construction

Co. v. Luciaiw Contracting Co., 284 N. Y. 223, 30 N. E. (2d) 483 (1940), where a
contractor made an assignment to one F. Plaintiff sued under 25-a. The contractor
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capacity and deposited in his personal account with the bank. In the common
situation, where a trustee, in violation of his fiduciary duty, draws checks
upon his account as trustee payable to a third person, the bank is not liable
unless it has knowledge of a misappropriation or unless it acts in bad faith. 6
The bank is under no duty of inquiry as to the propriety of the- conduct of
the fiduciary, for it may presume that-he was acting properly. As was said in
Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank :7

"A fiduciary may legally deposit trust funds in a bank to his individual
account and credit. Knowledge on the part of the bank of the nature
of the funds received and credited does not affect the character of the
act. The bank has the-right to presume that the fiduciary will apply the
funds to their proper purposes under the trust."
Any other rule requiring the bank to ,inquire as to the authority of the
defended on the grounds: (1) that the facts did not'bring the case under 25-a, (2) that
25-a was purely penal and did not create a civil cause of action, (3) that under 25-a
notice of a lien was required. The Court of Appeals found for the defendant stating that
the plaintiff could not recover under Section 25 without filing a lien. 25-a was scarcely
mentioned.
In-any event, it was recognized before the amendment that if a trust relationship did
arise, the customary safeguards for a bank were present. In a case similar to the Raymond case where a bank offset an indebtedness against a personal deposit which represented the funds of a public improvement, but the bank had no notice of the source of
the funds, the bank was not liable for the misappropriation. Barclay v. Corn Exchange
Bank, 267 N. Y. 630, 196 N. E. 614 (1935), aff'g 243 App. Div. 692 277 N. Y. Supp. 592
(1st Dep't. 1935), aff'g 155 Misc. 684, 280 N. Y. Supp 749 (Sup. Ct. 1934). But where
the bank did have knowledge of the source of the funds, a trust arose and the bank was
liable for a misappropriation made during the period when a lien could have been filed.
Fogarty v. City of Albany, 157 Misc. 30, 283 N. Y. Supp. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
It does not appear in the Raymond case whether a lien was filed. It may be inferred
from New York Trap Rock Corp. v. National Bank of Far Rockaway, N. Y. L. J. Dec.
24, 1941, 2113 (Sup. Ct.) that it was not. The present statute abolishes any need for it.
5
Note (1935)_ 20 CORNELL L. Q. 220; Note (1929) 14 CoRNELL L. Q. 472.
6
Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, 274 U. S. 473, 47 Sup. Ct. 661 (1926), rev'g Cahan v.
Empire Trust Co. v. Metropolitan National Bank, 1 F. Supp. 514 (D. C. Minn. 1932);
Kendall v. Fidelity Trust Co., 230 Mass. 238, 119 N. E. 861 (1918) ; Grace v. Corn
Exchange Bank, 287 N. Y. 94, 38 N. E. (2d) 449 (1941) ; Whiting v. Hudson Trust
C0., 234 N. Y. 394, 406, 138 N. E. 33, 37 (1923) ; Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y.
106, 111, 112 N. E. 759, 760 (1916) ; Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 9 UNIFORm LAws ANN.
(1932) § 153.
Contra: Mitchell v. First National Bank, 203 Ky. 770, 263 S. W. 15 (1924). Cf. First
National Bank v. Stringer, 207 Ky. 230, 268 S. W. 1101 (1925) ; Bank of Hickory v.
McPherson, 102 Miss. 852, 59 S. W. 934 (1912) ; United States Fidelity Co. v. People's
Bank, 127 Tenn. 720, 157 S. W. 414 (1913). See also Dennis Metal Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity
Union Trust Co., 99 N. J. L. 365, 368, 123 Atl. 614, 615 (1924) ; State v. Peterson, 167
Minn. 216, 218, 208 N. W. 761, 762 (1926).
If at the time of the deposit the bank had no notice that the fiduciary was acting wrong-

fully, but later receives such notice, it is liable for a subsequent withdrawal. Frazier v.
Erie Bank, 8 Watts & S. 18 (Pa. 1844) ; Miller v. Bank of Washington, 176 N. C. 152,
96 S. E. 977 (1918)1
7218 N. Y. 106, 111, 112 N. E. 759, 760 (1916).
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8
fiduciary would be so burdensome as to cripple banking transactions.
9
As shown by the Bischoff case, New York follows the general rule as to
a trustee. Yet in the past New York has held that when a corporate officer
deposited checks payable to the corporation in his personal° account, the bank
was under a duty of inquiry before receiving such deposits.' As there appears
small basis for such a distinction, and as the Uniform Fiduciaries Act fails to
differentiate between a trustee and a corporate officer, it is highly improbable
that the courts would now impose such a duty of inquiry."
But a different rule is applied when the bank is itself interested in the
transaction, as in the Ra3nnond case. 12 Several possibilities exist: (1) when
there is an existing debt to the bank the fiduciary may endorse a check payable to himself as a fiduciary and deposit it to erase the debt;13 (2) he may
draw a check directly payable to the bank. In either case the bank, under the
Uniform Fiduciaries Act, is under a duty of inquiry. 1 4 But the bank is not
under a duty when (3) the check is drawn by the fiduciary payable to himself
and fe then indorses it to the bank. 15
On the other hand, the Uniform Act does not appear to cover the case where
an antecedent debt is owed by the fiduciary to the bank, the fiduciary deposits
trust funds to his account, and the bank offsets the debt against the deposit.
8
Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank, 287 N. Y. 94, 102, 38 N. E. (2d) 449, 452 (1941);
Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., 234 N. Y. 394, 406, 138 N. E. 33, 37 (1923).
9218 N. Y. 106, 112 N. E. 759 (1916).
'OWagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park National Bank, 228 N. Y. 37, 126 N. E. 347
(1920); Niagara Woolen Co. v. Pacific Bank, 141 App. Div. 265, 126 N. Y. Supp. 890
(1st Dep't. 1910). But cf. Havana Central R.R. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 198 N. Y.
423, 92 N. E. 12 (1910), where it was held that when an officer of a corporation deposited one of its checks payable to himself in other than the drawee bank that its
acceptance by the drawee bank excused the duty of inquiry by the depositee.
Reasons for denying protection to the bank are: (1) The indorsement is not within
the authority of the official and has the same effect as a forgery. Whiting v. Hudson
(2) A corporate officer has
Trust Co., 234 N. Y. 394, 405, 138 N. E. 33, 37 (1923).
less control over the fund than a trustee. See Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 854, 856,
rejecting this latter distinction.
11Cf. Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank, 287 N. Y. 94, 38 N. E. (2d) 449 (1941). See

also the N. Y.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW

denying liability when a corporate officer

draws a corporate check payable to himself or indorses a check payable to the corporation
and cashes or deposits it to his personal account if the bank has an authorization from
the corporation showing that the officer is permitted to draw or indorse such checks
within a stated sum.
32 Scorr, TRusTs (1939) § 324.4.
13
UNIFORm FIDUCIARIES Acr § 4.
4
1 UNIFOriM FIDUiCIAlEs AcT § 5.
15UNiFoRm FIDUCARIES AcT § 6. A commissioner's note to § 6 states that in the first
tvo instances there is a strong presumption that the fiduciary is acting improperly, while
in the third instance it is stated that it may very well be that the fiduciary was entitled
to receive payment out of his principal's funds, as for salary, commissions, or dividends.
Accordingly, in the third case the creditor is not liable unless he has actual knowledge
that the fiduciary was acting improperly or in bad faith. In the first two cases, however,
the creditor bank is liable unless the fiduciary was actually acting properly. See Scott,
Participationin a Beach of Trust (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 454, n. 26; Note (1935) 20
CORNELL L. Q. 220, n. 13.
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Since the same result is accomplished as in the previous cases, similar rules
should apply here. In Colby v. Riggs National Bank, 6 the fiduciary withdrew
funds from a trust account and placed them in his pei'sonal account in the
same bank. When the fiduciary paid a personal indebtedness to the bank by
a check drawn against his personal account, the bank was held liable for that
amount. The bank was not held liable for payments to others by the fiduciary
since the bank did not have actual knowledge; nor did it act in bad faith
under Sections 9 and 6 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. As a result, it appears
that when the funds are obtained either by a check payable to the fiduciary
as such and endorsed to the bank, or by a check drawn by the fiduciary on
trust funds payable to the bank, or when the bank merely sets off the debt
against the account' of the fiduciary with notice that trust funds are deposited
therein, the bank is under a duty of inquiry and acts at its peril. 17
In New York the courts have gone far in holding the bank to a duty of
inquiry and constructive notice. In the Bischoff case, 18 when the executor of
an estate deposited to his personal account in the defendant bank checks signed
by himself as executor and later paid personal debts to the bank and third
persons by drawing against-this account, the Court of Appeals held the bank
liable for the sums paid to it and for all payments on the outside debts after
the date of first payment to the bank. At about the same date the Massachusetts courts held, in Allen v. Puritan Trust Company,'0 that the bank was
liable to the extent of the checks used to discharge the debt of the fiduciary
to the bank. In both cases the bank was charged with a duty of inquiry as
to the authority of the fiduciary to deposit the funds in his personal account
and then draw upon them because of the form of the check originally deposited in the bank.
At first blush the New York Court of Appeals apparently relaxed this
strict duty upon the bank in Clarke v. Public National Bank.20 There a com1692 'F. (2d) 183 (App. D. C. 1937) ; Note (1938) 38 CoL. L. Rxv. 495; Note (1938)
23 WAsH.
U. L. Q. 271; Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 994.
17Where money has been deposited in an account marked fiduciary, the bank cannot
offset any indebtedness. United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U. S. 387,
45 Sup. Ct. 338 (1925) ; Bundy v. Town of Monticello, 84 Ind. 119 (1882) ; Baker v.
New York National Exchange Bank, 100 N. Y. 31, 2 N. E. 452 (1885).
Where the funds have been mingled with personal deposits, and the bank has knowledge
that some of the funds are fiduciary, the bank cannot offset the account. National Bank
v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54 (1881); United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. V.
Union Bank & Trust Co., 228 Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) ; Keeney v. Bank of Italy,
33 Cal. App. 515, 165 Pac. 735. (1917).
When the bank has knowledge that funds marked fiduciary have been deposited in a
personal account, the bank cannot set off a prior debt. Union Stockyards National Bank
v. Moore, 79 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Clemmer v. Drover's National Bank, 157
Ill. 206, 41 N. E. 728 (1895); Cable v. Iowa State Savings Bank, 197 Iowa 393, 194
N. W. 957 (1923) ; Wegershev v. Midland National Bank, 184 Minn. 393, 238 N. W. 792
(1931) ; Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., 287 N. Y. 94,.38 N. E. (2d) 449 (1941).
Cf. Barclay v. Corn Exchange Bank, 267 N. Y. 630, 196 N. E. 614 (1935).
18218 N. Y. 106, 112 N. E. 759 (1916).
19211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916 (1912).
20259 N. Y. 285, 181 N. E. 574 (1932).
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mittee for an incompetent was directed, by order of the court which appointed
him, 'to deposit all funds coming into his bands in the X bank. In violation
of this order he deposited checks payable to himself as committee in his personal account in the defendant bank. After he had drawn checks on this
account for personal purposes, the court held the bank not liable. The
Raymond case cites the Clarke case as holding that the mere deposit of funds
which stand in trust form to the personal accciunt of the fiduciary will not
per se put the bank upon the duty of inquiry. 21 As the Clarke case is one in
which the bank was not itself interested, the result is obviously correct under
the general rule or under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, but it seems irrelevant
in the Raymond case where the bank set off its demand note for $78,000.
In Grace v. CorA Exchange Bank Trust Company,2 2 the fiduciary transferred
sums of money from a trust account to his personal account in the bank.
Later he transferred some of the funds from his personal account to the
account in the same bank of a corporation. With these funds a payment was
made of a debt owing from the corporation to the bank. The court held the
bank liable for this sm, not because the bank had notice and knowingly participated in the diversion, but because the bank was under .a duty to restore
the funds since it did nfot have a superior equity in them. There had been
many overdrafts of the account of the fiduciary which he repeatedly cover~d
by drawing checks upon the trust account, and the court held that the bank
had notice of the misappropriation of the funds. The court felt that it would
not place too great a burden upon the bank to examine the two accounts and
note the correlation between the overdrawings of the personal account and the
checks drawn against the trust funds and deposited in the personal account.
But as the bank was not held liable for all sums paid to third parties after
the date of payment to the bank, the case appears less stringent than the
Bischoff case.
In the Raymond case the Court of Appeals found that the defendant bank
had neither actual knowledge nor reasonable grounds to suspect the presence
of a subcontractor claimant to the proceeds of the warrant. The language of
the court2 leads to the possible inference that the decision may be based upon
what has been called by some courts a "banker's lien."24 There is confusion
in some decisions between the right to se off and a banker's lien, and, generally, both have been treated similarly. Here, despite the prior agreement25
that the demand note should be paid from the proceeds of the warrant, there
was only a right of set off available to the bank. When the contractor, 0,
deposited the indorsed warrant in his personal account, a debtor-creditor
relationship arose. But though the transaction be treated as a banker's lien,
21

See note 6 supra.
22287 N. Y. 94, 38 N. E. (2d) 449 (1941).
23288 N. Y. at 460, 43 N. E. (2d) at 490 (1942).
24
Baton v. Alexander City Bank, 179 Ala. 490, 497, 60 So. 313, 315 (1912) ; Note (1925)
38 HARv. L. RV. 800.

25Cf. Hatch v. Fourth National Bank, 147 N. Y. 184, 41 N. E. 403 (1895) ; Hutchinson
v. Manhattan Co., 150 N. Y. 250, 44 N. E. 775 (1896).
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still it would not prevail over the beneficiary of the trust unless the bank were
the antecedent debt-and lacked notice of the
a transferee for value-here
26
character of the funds.
It appears from the facts of the case that the defendant was under a duty
of inquiry, and failing that, had constructive notice of the presence of claimants
to the funds.
In Union Stockyards National Bank v. Gillespie2 7 where a factor deposited
the proceeds of the sale of a consignment of stock, the court held the bank to
a duty of inquiry as to the character of the deposit. The bank could not,
against the consignor, apply the deposit to the payment of an individual debt
of the factor. Knowledge that the depositors were factors was sufficient to
create the duty of inquiry as to the character of the fuhds and the presence
of an owner.28 In the Raymond case the bank knew that the depositor was a
contractor, that the warrant was for payment for work upon a public improvement, and that there would be materialmdn who might be claimants to the
funds. Furthermore, since circumstances may put a bank on constructive
notice of the presence of a fiduciary relationship, they should put the bank on
notice of the presence of a beneficiary.2 Here the contractor had been forced
to borrow from the bank to continue operations upon a large contract. Obviously the contractor would not have immediately available all the labor and
supplies necessary to complete the contract; and apparently, in light of the
prior loans and overdraft, the contractor would not have sufficient funds, other
than the proceeds 6f the warrant, to pay these men and expenses.30 Thus, if
the bank had notice of possible claimants, and a trust arose31 under the present
amendment to Section 25-a, then under the rule of the Bischoff case, the warrant for a public improvement would give notice of the nature of the funds
32
and the bank should not be allowed to offset its claim against the deposit.

Under the approach of the Grace case the subcontractor beneficiary under the
trust would have an interest in the funds superior to that of the bank, and
the bank again would be forced to return, the amount that it had offset.
Hamilton S. White
26
Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333 (U. S. 1845); Van Alen v. American National Bank,
52 N. Y. 1 (1873) ; 4 POmEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941) § 1048; Scorr,
TRUSTS (1939) §§ 294, 294.2.
27137
U. S. 411, 11 Sup. Ct. 118 (1890).
25
See also Central National Bank v. Connecticut Life Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54
(1881) (agent) ; American Trust & Banking Co. v. Boone, 102 Ga. 202, 29 S. E. 182
(1897) (deposit of check by a person to whom it was made payable as administrator) ;
Bundy v. Monticello, 84 Ind. 119 (1881) (to one as "trustee") ; Keeney v. Bank of Italy,
33 29Cal. App. 515, 165 Pac. 735 (1917).
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Queens Co. Trust Co., 226 N. Y. 225, 233, 123 N. E. 370,
372 (1919); First National Bank of Paterson v. Broadway Bank, 156 N. Y. 459, 51 N. E.
398 (1898); Anderson v. Blood, 152 N. Y. 285, 46 N. E. 493 (1897).
30
Grossman, Trust and Penal Provisioms of the New York State Mechanic's Lien Law
5 BROOKLYN L. REv. 14, 19-22.
(1935)
2
SIee notes.4 and 6 supra.
32
1t would be interesting to see, if a recovery were allowed, whether it would be
limited to the amount that the bank received for itself, or whether under the measure of
damages in the Bischoff case the full $80,000 were recovered..
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Bankruptcy: Assignment of accounts receivable: Requirement of notice
to debtors: Preferential transfer.-A recent decision-by the Supreme Court
of the United States is likely to have far-reaching effect on the assignment
of accounts receivable as a security device.- In Corn Exchange Natiool
Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434, 63 Sup. Ct. 679 (1943), the
Court, applying Section 60 (a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy Act as amended
by the Chandler Act,2 and the appropriate state law,3 that of Pennsylvania,
held that an assignment of accounts, though actually for present value, was
a voidable preference within the above section. The instant holding imposes
such a burden on financing by this method that good credit practice jmakes
highly unlikely its further existence in a number of states; or at least so curtails its effective use that transactions 'of this nature, grown large in the
past few decades, perhaps will now- dwindle to the negligible position in the
credit structure which they occupied in the late nineteenth century.
First to be determined is whether or not the assignment of accounts should
continue as a means of securing advances. A rather large group of persons
are of the opinion that there is no legitimate need for accounts receivable
financing in the credit field. 4 Their attitude is due largely to the unfortunate
early history of assigned accounts. The first borrowers to use this means of
credit to any great extent were those whose precarious financial position
made impossible the obtaining of credit in any other, manner. The device was
nearly perfect for unscrupulous use. Although notice to the obligors of the
assignor was required to perfect the assignment against subsequent assignees, 5
no notoriety was necessary in order that 'the first assignee prevail against
creditors of the assignor. 6 Since the possibility of a subsequent assignment
was slight, 7 lenders could be found who would assume such a risk so long
as they were protected against the chief danger of undisclosed financingclaims of creditors of the borrower. So it was that upon an assignment of
accounts and the usual insolvency, those who had extended credit without
'For a comprehensive analysis of the economic aspects of accounts receivable financing,
(National Bureau of

see SAULNIER AND JACOBY, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING

Economic Research, 1943). For a discussion of assignment of future rights, see Note
(1940) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 283.
252 STAT. 840, 869, 870 (1938) ; 11 U. S. C. § 96 (a) (1940).
3
The effectiveness of a transfer where bankruptcy intervened was determined on the
basis of state law even before the decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64,
584 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938). See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353, 45 Sup. Ct. 566 (1924).
Typical of this view is the statement by the Court in the instant case at 439-440,
63 Sup. Ct. at 683: "Receivables often are assigned only when credit in a similar amount
is not available through other channels. Interest and other charges are high, and an
assignment often is correctly understood as a symptom of financial distress." For a
criticism of the failure of the Court to distinguish between such transactions by finance
companies and commercial banks, see In Re :---:Accounts Receivable Financing, American
.Banker, March 13 and April '3, 1943.
51 SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 163.
62 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Williston & Thompson, rev. ed., 1936) § 434.
"A subsequent assignee was protected against prior assignments only if he became
such without notice. The small group which engaged in this type of financing made
effective subsequent assignments unlikely.
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security discovered for the first time that the accounts receivable of their
debtor were not available to them. The'stigma of "secret lien" transaction
began to attach to all assignments of accounts. Sound business men gave no
consideration to this device of "last ditch" fipancing. The more circumspect
lending agencies avoided it. Apparently the potential utility of assigned
accounts was not to be realized, when, within a few years, a complete change
came about.
Financially secure firms which had looked with disfavor upon the assignment of accounts began to discover the flexibility and convenience of this
method of obtaining credit. It was easily adapted to the financial needs of
seasonal enterprises, where sales expand faster than working capital; and
concerns whose volume of business remained relatively constant throughout
the year were attracted by the simplicity of the device. Thus there arose a
legitimate demand for such financing, and commercial banks, with abundant
unused lending capacity, were quick to respond. In an amazingly short
time the once discredited device achieved respectability. No longer could it
truthfully be said that an assignment of accounts of itself indicated financial
weakness. Despite this fact, the early reputation of this credit method continued to influence the attitude of many toward it, and resulted in an unjustifiable disapproval of its use.
In fairness it must be said that the adoption of this means of obtaining
advances by legitimate credit seekers did not eliminate all valid objections
to its use. The element of secrecy still remained. Where in the past, however, assignments had been kept secret tb conceal the credit structure of the
assignor, now the reason was the impracticability of notifying multiple
obligors. It is true that regardless of why the transaction is kept secret, if
insolvency should occur the unsecured creditors are deprived of apparent
assets; but that is no reason to condemn legitimate assignments of accounts.
Rather is it reason for legislatures to take cognizance of the extensive use
and utility of this method of securing advances and to provide an easy
means of giving notoriety to assignments. It would seem that a type of
transaction which involves in the aggregate over a billion dollars annually,8
and which had been rapidly increasing in volume, is sufficiently important
to justify continued existence when, of the two objections to its use, one
is largely illusory, and the other easily remedied by statutory provision for
notice.
If one accepts the proposition that assigned accounts should continue as
a means of securing advances, Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co.
v. Klauder becomes particularly significant. In this case the X Co. assigned
accounts to the bank to secure contemporaneous loans. No notice of the
assignment was given to the obligors. Subsequently an involuntary petition
Jn bankruptcy was filed against the X'Co. Adjudication followed. Because
of the failure of the bank to give notice to the obligors, the trustee challenged its right to the benefit of the security. He contended that the transaction amounted to a voidable preference under Section 60 (a) and (b) of
8SAUiNI-ER AND JACOBY,

op. cit. supra note 1, at 34-38.
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the amended Bankruptcy Act9 as implemented by the law in effect in Pennsylvania at the time of the assignment. The first sentence of subdivision (a)
restates, in the main, the prior law with regard to a preference: "A preference is a transfer ...of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit
of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by
such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing . . .
of the petition in bankruptcy . . . the effect of which transfer will be to
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class." The second sentence contains the controversial language: "For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this
section, a transfer shall be deemed-to have been made at the time when it
became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and
no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so
transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein, and, if such
transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
. . . it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy."
Subdivi~ion (b) provides for the avoidance of any such preference if the
creditor benefited thereby has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is
insolvent at the time of the transfer. In order to perfect an assignment
against subsequent assignees, it was required in Pennsylvania that notice
of the assignment be given to the obligors.' The issue thus was a narrow
one. The bank had knowledge of the insolvency of the X Co. when the loans
were made. The assignments had never been perfected under Pennsylvania
law. The sole question was whether or not the section made antecedent a
debt actually created contemporaneously with the loan.
The Supreme Court held that it did. In reaching this conclusion, the
time-of-transfer provision was emphasized rather than that defining a preference in terms of an antecedent debt. Realistically speaking, there can be no
antecedent debt where present value for value is given. However, the second
sentence of the section was held to divorce in point of time the unperfected
transfer and the loan, thereby creating in legal contemplation an antecedent
indebtedness regardless of the actual facts. So far as this note is concerned,
it is immaterial whether or not the position of the Supreme Court is wellsupported."- The decision undoubtedly \vill stand. 1 2 The important question
is how to nullify its effect upon assignments of accounts.
9
Supra note 2.
'0 First Nat. Bank of Bangor v. Bangor Trust Co., 297 Pa. 115, 146 Atl. 595 (1929);
Phillips's
Estate (No. 3), 205 Pa. 515, 55 Atl. 213 (1903).
1
l See, McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act (1937)
4 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 369, 388; 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1941) § 60.48; 2
GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (1940) § 534; Cohen and Gerber,
Mortgages and Accounts Receivable (1941) 29 GEo. L. J. 555, 572; Neuhoff, Assignment
of Accounts Receivable as Affected by the Chandler Act (1940) 34 ILL. L. REV. 538;
Hanna, Some Unsolved Problen under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act (1943) 43
COL. L. Rnv. 58; Mulder, Ambiguities in the Chandler Act (1940) 89 U. OF PA. L.

REV. 10, 23.

12"Whatever advantages may inhere in non-notification financing which might have
made Congress reluctant to jeopardize it, the system also has characteristics which make
it impossible for us to conclude that it is to be distinguished from the secret liens Congress was admittedly trying to reach." 318 U. S. at 439, 63 Sup. Ct. at 683 (1943).
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The answer to this question already has been suggested: a statutory provision for notice. 3 All that is required under Section 60 (a) and (b) and
the" instant case in order to protect the first assignee is perfection of the
assignment under state law. The common law method of perfection by .notice
to the obligors is not practicable where a great many accounts are concerned.
A public recording system similar to those used to give notice of mortgages
and conditional sales would eliminate the difficulty. Such a method, however, would involve a great deal of detail. A procedure on the order of that
provided 'for by the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, where all that is required
for notice is the public recordation of an intent to engage in such transactions, is more suited to the nature of accounts.' 4 The most feasible solution, however, is that which already has been put into practice by two states, 5
one of which is Pennsylvania, the original forum of the instant case. These
statutes provide that the noting of the assighment on the books of the assignor constitutes notice thereof. The procedure is extremely simple. The
effect, moreover, is to disclose an assignment to persons who have a legitimate interest therein, while withholding such information from those whose
concern is merely officious.
It should be noted that, even in the absence of statute, not all jurisdictions
follow the common law rule which requires notice to the obligors to protect
the assignee against subsequent assignments. 16 In these jurisdictions, the
assignment itself operates as a perfection against creditors and subsequent
assignees. The instant case, therefore, apparently will not affect such transactions in those states. However, there still remains the problem of conflict
of laws. Furthermore, statutes providing for notice would eliminate all
objections to the secrecy which otherwise obtains and elevate the assignment
of accounts to the level of other security devices so far as this element, is
concerned. The future of assigned accounts, even in these jurisdictions,
would be more secure if such statutes were passed. It would seem that this
method of financing
is sufficiently important to merit a Uniform State Law
7
on the subject.1

George E. Flinn*
*Third-year student, School of Law, University of Pittsburgh. A.B., University of
Pittsburgh,
1941.
'5 An alternative remedy is amendment of the Bankruptcy Act. A bill to this effect
has been introduced in the Senate. Smq. BILl No. 3554, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939).
It proposes to protect assigned accounts by deeming a transfer perfected when it has
been fully consummated between debtor and transferee. Because of the careful consideration given/to the drafting of the Chandler Act, however, patch-work amendment
is unlikely. For a brief. history of the Act, see McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler
Bill4 to Amend the Bankruptcy Act (1937) 4 U OF Cmi L. REv. 369, 375.
0hio has adopted this method of giving notice. O9o GExi. CoDE ANbT. (Page,
Supp. 1942) §§ 8509-3 to 8509-6.351941, July 31; P. L. 606; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1942) tit. 69, §§ 561-563.
For an analysis of this statute see Crane, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of
Chattel
Security (1942) 8 U. OF Pn-r. L. REv. 104. Georgia, Act of Feb. 26, 1943.
' 6See Notes (1924) 31 A. L. R. 876; (1937) 110 A. L. R. 774; Note (1940) 25
CORNELL
L. Q. 283.
17
For discussion of problems arising from the principal case, see Montgomery, Review
of Supreme Court Ruling on Assignment of Accounts Receivable in the May, 1943,
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Contracts: Third party beneficiaries: Rights of donee beneficiaries in
New York.-A third party beneficiary was denied recovery recently in a New
York court of original jurisdiction on the ground that, "An examination of
the law reveals that a donee beneficiary must be related by blood or marriage
in order to avail himself of a contract made for his benefit or the contract is
a public benefit contract."' Although this conclusion is supported by precedent
cases, 2 it is evidence of a retrogressive trend in the law of third party beneficiaries.
When the decision in Seaver v. Ransom3 was handed down by the Court
of Appeals in 1918, it was regarded as an innovation in the contract law of
New York. Four classes of cases were enumerated in which a third person
not in privity with the promise or the consideration admittedly could enforce
the contract: (1) Where there is a pecuniary obligation running from the
promisee to the beneficiary which the promisor undertakes to pay; (2) Where
the contract is made for the benefit of a wife, affianced wife, or child of a
pai-ty to the contract; (3) Where a municipality seeks to protect its inhabitants by ovenants for their benefit; .and (4) Where, at the request of the
promisee, the promise runs directly to the beneficiary, although he does not
furnish the consideration. Recovery was not necessarily to be limited to these
four classes, although the court believed that, as a practical matter, the classification was probably broad enough to include most third party beneficiaries.
The technical effect of the decision was simply to bring nieces into the "closerelationship" class, but the court's dictum candidly endorsing a liberal policy
toward third party beneficiaries created the belief that in New York "the
beneficiary of a promise, dearly designated as such, is seldom left without a
remedy."4
On reviewing the history of Seaver v. Ransom, it appears that the opinion
has received much commendation, but little application. Except in comparatively few cases, the courts have limited third party beneficiaries to the four
classes named above instead of following the progressive dictates of Judge
issue of

CREDIT AND FINANCrIlAL MANAGEMENT, reprinted in the JOURNAL OF THE NAREFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY (July, 1943) 119-120.

TIONAL AssoCIATION OF

'First Trust Co. of Albany v. Arnold, - Misc. -, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 175, 180 (Sup.
Ct. 1942). The adoption of this narrow construction of the doctrine of third party
beneficiaries was unnecessary in this case, since there was an alternative ground for
denying recovery to the plaintiff. The court adnitted that there was no evidence that
consideration
was given for the promise.
2
Dreyer v. Hyde, 251 N. Y. 450, 167 N. E. 583 (1920) ; Jacoby v. Speyer, 127 Misc. 33,
215 N. Y. Supp. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1926) ; Smart Set Clothing Co. v. Frank Knitting Mills,
191 App. Div. 33, 180 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dep't. 1920); Rochester Dry Goods Co. v.
Fahy, 111 App. Div. 748, 97 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (4th Dep't. 1906), aff'd, 188 N. Y. 629,
81 N. E. 1174 (1907).
3224
N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 639 (1918), 2 A. L. R. 1187, 1193 (1919).
4
Cardozo, C. J., in Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 181, 174 N. E. 441, 445, 74
A. L. R. 1139, 1145, 1153 (1931) ; Note (1931) 16 CORNELL L: Q. 419. See also, Andrews,
The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in Recent Years and How They Have Affected
Substantive Law (1927) 12 CORNELL L. Q. 433, 448; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, N. Y.
ANNOT. (1936) 9 135 (a) ; Note (1918) 4 CORNELL L. Q. 53.
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Pound. The donee 5 beneficiary as such has not been fully recognized in New
York. Yet, Judge Pound's dictum has not been without influence. It furnished the basis for extending the boundaries of the four classes beyond where
recovery had already been allowed. The New York courts had recognized
since Lawrence v. Fox,6 that a beneficiary might enforce a contract when the
promisee was financially indebted to him. Relying on the Seaver decision, the
courts held that aisy obligation due the beneficiary from the promisee would'
constitute the former a creditor beneficiary. Apparently, a moral duty, such
as that owed by a public weigher to a prospective purchaser, 7 or a statutory
Iduty, e.g. that of an athletic commission to creditors of clubs under its supervision,8 is sufficient. "The r6quirement of some obligation or duty running
from the promisee to the third party beneficiary has been progressively relaxed
until a mere shadow of the relationship suffices, if indeed it has not reached
the vanishing point."9 In straining to find a moral or equitable obligation, the
courts have confused fact and fiftion until the value of the classification as a
rule of thumb has largely disappeared. Distant relatives have been permitted
to sue, but the opinions do not disclose whether they are within an extension
of the "close-relation" class or whether because of a vague moral duty,' 0
they are "creditor beneficiaries." -The "close-relation" class has thus far been
extended to a brother,"- step-child,' 2 and possibly to next-of-kin.x3
A more liberal trend toward third party beneficiaries is noticeable in the
public contract class. Where the municipality is the promisee, if an express
or implied intent can be found to benefit individuals as well as the community
5For purposes of this note, a donee beneficiary, as defined by the RESTATEMENT, CON(1936) § 133, is a beneficiary of a promise where it appears that the purpose of
the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance "is to make a gift
to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some performance
neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary."
620 N. Y. 268 (1859).
7Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922), 23 A. L. R. 1425, 1429
(1923).
8McClare v. Mass. Bonding & Insurance Co., 266 N. Y. 31, 195 N. E. 15 (1935).
TRACTS

Did. at 379, 195 N. E. at 17 (1935).
'oShientag, J., in Fredenburg v. Fredenburg, 159 Misc. 525, 526, 288 N. Y. Supp.
377, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1936): "The right to sue is not dependent on any legal obligation
of the promisee to support the beneficiary, for 'the natural and moral duty of the husband
or parent to provide for the future of the wife or child sustains the action on the contract
made for their benefit'. (Seaver v. Raltsom ...) The gradual expansion of the doctrine
of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 628, may make even this sort of obligation from the promisee
to the beneficiary unnecessary to entitle the latter to sue."
"'Croker v. New York Trust Co., 245 N. Y. 17, 156 N. E. 81 (1927). Where the
court recognized the promisee's right to specific performance of the promise for the
benefit of his brother and sister, assuming as alleged by the defendant, that the beneficiaries
could
themselves sue at laW in New York.
' 2 Thomas v. Hens, 219 App. Div. 627, 220 N. Y. Supp. 785 (4th Dep't. 1927) ; Read v.
Morford, 203 App. Div. 166, 196 N. Y. Supp. 433 (lst Dep't. 1922). This latter decision,
like Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N. Y. 294, 183 N. E. 429 (1932) held that it is
sufficient that there is a close relationship between the promisee and the beneficiary
without
the necessity of relationship between the'promisor and beneficiary.
' 2 Morgan v. Sanborn, 225 N. Y. 457, 122 N. E. 696 (1919) ; Roseman v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 148 Misc. 132, 265 N. Y. Supp. 557 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
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as a whole, the individuals may sue.14 When the promisor undertakes to perform a municipal function, he is liable to any inhabitant to whom the municipality owes a duty and no intention to benefit such inhabitant need be
evidenced.' 5 In this respect the inhabitant occupies a status analogous to that
of a creditor beneficiary. Where the promisor is performing a service, which
the municipal promisee is not obliged to render and there is an intent to allow
recovery, the beneficiary may sue even though he is not an inhabitant of the
municipality. 16 Although he is clearly a donee beneficiary, he is allowed toenforce the contract because he qualifies under the "public contract" class
set forth in Seaver v. Ransom.
The fourth class consisting of cases "where at the request of a party to
the contract, the promise runs directly to the beneficiary although he does not
furnish the consideration,"' 7 was established in New York a century ago. It
was then that the historic requirement of privity with the consideration was
abandoned.' s At that time there was, however, no relaxation of the demand,
that the beneficiary be in privity with the promise. Since judge Pound cited
old cases' 9 as his authority for the fourth class, he might be regarded as
restating the existing law. His failure to mention privity with the promise
expressly in his definition of the fourth class, has led his successors to extend
the class to include not only cases where there was no privity but also cases
where the beneficiary was not identified. A materialman may maintain an
action on a contractor's bond expressly given for the benefit of any materialman, although the owner was under no obligation to the materialman and the
materialman did not know of the bond before he furnished the materials. 20
One belonging to a class mentioned in a liability policy as an operator of an
automobile with permission' of the insured may sue on the policy. 21 Stock14 Coley v. Cohen, 289 N. Y. 365, 45 N. E. (2d) 913 (1942) ; Pond v. New Rochelle
Water Co., 183 N. Y. 330, 76 N. E. 211 (1906) ; Prescott v: Collins, 263 App. Div. 690,
35 N. Y. S. (2d) 135 (3d Dep't. 1942) ; 1 WILLISo N, CONTRAcrs (Williston & Thompson,
rev.5 ed., 1936) § 373.
1 Rigney v. N. Y. Central & Hudson River Railroad Co., 217 N. Y. 31, 111 N. E. 226
(1916).
lOWilson v. Oliver Costich Co,., Inc., 231 App. Div. 346, 247 N. Y. Supp. 131 (4th
Dep't. 1931), aff'd withwut opinion, 256 N. Y. 629, 177 N. E. 169 (1932); New York
Pneumatic Service Co. v. P. T. Cox Contracting Co., 201 App. Div. 33, 193 N. Y. Supp.
65517 (1922), ail'd without opinion, 235 N. Y. 567, 139 N. E. 737 (1923).
Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 238, 120 N. E. 639, 641 (1918), 2 A. L. R. 1187,
1188,
1193 (1919).
8
1 Schermerhorn v.Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. 140 (1806) ; Barker v.Buckin, 2 Denio 45
(1846).
19 Bank of Sing Sing v.Chalmers, 144 N. Y. 432 (1895) ; Hamilton v.Hamilton, 127
App.
Div. 871, 112 N. Y. Supp. 10 (4th Dep't. 1908).
20
See Graybar Electric Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 157 Misc. 275, 283 N. Y. Supp. 522
(Sup. Ct. 1935), for one of the few analyses of this fourth class. Seaboard Surety Co.
v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 277 N. Y. 429, 14 N. E. (2d) 778 (1938); Maltby
& Sons Co. v. Wade, 131 Misc. 143, 227 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1928), af'd, 224 App.
Div. 779, 230 N. Y. Supp. 839 (4th Dep't. 1928); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Williston &
Thompson, rev. ed., 1936) § 372; Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractor's
Surety Bonds (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 1, reprinted in THoiroPsoN et al., SELEcrD READINGS
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931)

667.

*

P'Barsuk v. Independence Indemnity Co., 142 Misc. 60, 254 N. Y. Supp, 352 (Sup. Ct.
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holders of a lessor railroad are entitled to sue on the lessee's agreement with
22
During the early days of the New
the lessor to pay its rent as dividends.
Deal, employees were allowed to sue under the N.R.A. codes which their
employers had signed. 23 That result was easily attained in view of its political
union members to sue on a
necessity and the precedents set by cases allowing
24
contract between the union and the employer.
In each of these cases, a donee beneficiary enforced a contract to which he
was not a party. In order to reconcile them with the above mentioned statement that a third party beneficiary may recover only when a legal or moral
duty is owing, they must be regarded either as an extension of the creditor
beneficiary class or as exceptions to the rule. To say that a car owner is
morally bound to insure a borrower, or that a building owner is equitably
obliged to guarantee payment to sub-contractors, materialmen, or laborers is
to approach absurdity. To say that these importanit cases are exceptions to
the rule is to admit that the rule has outlived its usefulness. Perhaps this is
why the courts which adhere to the old rule have,ignored these cases in their
discussions.
The third party beneficiary doctrine has played an important role recently
in determining the rights of co-owners and beneficiaries of United States
Savings Bonds. Treasury regulations 25 provide that the person designated as
beneficiary on the death of the registered owner of a savings bond will "be
recognized as the sole and absolute owner of the bond, and it will be paid
only to him." In spite of the regulation, a New York supreme court decision,
Deyo v. Adans, held 26 that the bond was payable to the owner's executor
and not to the named beneficiary. The court found that the transaction was
invalid as a testamentary disposition because the necessary formalities were
lacking. Although there was no express rejection of the third party beneficiary
theory, reference was made to McCarthy v. Peiret27 which declared the theory
inapplicable in a similar situation. The Deyo, Decker, and McCarthy cases
were criticized, 28 and were not followed by the courts in other jurisdictions,
1931). A related problem arises in suits by an injured party against insurance companies

on indemnity policies. See Laube, The Social Vice of Accident Inuraiwe (1932) 80
U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 189; Note (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 400; 1 WILLISTON, CoNTacTs
& Thompson, rev. ed., 1936) § 164 a.
(Williston
22
Bowers v. I. R. T. Co., 121 Misc. 250, 201 N. Y. Supp. 198 (Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd,
208 App. Div. 768, 202 N. Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dep't. 1924). Followed in Peabody v.
I. R. T. Co., 121 Misc. 647, 202 N. Y. Supp. 287 (Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd, 212 App. Div.
502,
23 209 N. Y. Supp. 380 (1st Dep't. 1925).
Canton v. Palms, Inc., 152 Misc. 347, 273 N. Y. Supp. 239 (City Ct. 1934) ; Morrison
v. 24
Gentler, 152 Misc. 710, 273 N. Y. Supp. 953 (Mun. Ct. 1934).
Gulla v. Barton, 174 App. Div. 899, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1116 (3d Dep't. 1914); cf.
Rotnofsky v. Capitol Distributors Corp., 262 App. Div. 521, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 563 (1st
Dep't. 1941), noted in (1942) 11 BROOKLYN L. REv. 217; and Levine v. Meitzel, 34
N.25Y. S. (2d) 561 (City Ct. 1942).
Regulations Governing United States Savings Bonds § 315.36 (Treasury Dep't.
Circ. No. 530, 5th Rev. 6.1.1942, as amended 11.23.1942).
26178 Misc. 859, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 734 (Sup. Ct. App. Term, 1942). The court cited
and followed Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254 (1939).
/39
ot4k.
v
Z, 0M/V
27281 N. Y. 407, 24 N. E. (2d) 102 (1939)
28
Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 12 5 F. (2d) 127 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Note
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which regarded the transaction as a contract between the government and
the bond owner which was to be construed according to federal regulations. 29
When the reluctance of the New York courts to applythe third party beneficiary doctrine in these cases became of national significance in its possible
effect on the war loan drives,30 the New York legislature passed an acte' to
assure the purchasers of United States bonds that the person designated as
payee in the instrument would receive the money. Subsequently, Surrogate
Foley denied the application of one co-executor of the Deyo estate to prevent
the other from obtaining a final determination of the action, and sustained the
other co-executor's contention that the bonds were not assets of the estate.32
The surrogate approved the cases which had held the designated beneficiaries
to be donee beneficiaries, and stated that the law of New York would enforce
a contract made for the benefit of a third person. He then added that, "This
is especially true where the beneficiary is a close relative. The beneficiary
here is the sister of the decedent."' ' On its facts, this decision falls within
one of the Seaver classes and cannot be regarded as the adoption of a general
third party beneficiary doctrine. Undoubtedly, a case will arise in which the
beneficiary of the bond is not within one of the recognized classes. There is,
however, little likelihood that a different result will be reached since most
jurists, including Surrogate Foley, have conceded that a bond is a contract
subject to federal regulations which "constitute the supreme law of the land
and any State law or supposed policy in conflict with them cannot prevail."' 34
From the confusion in the field of contracts for the benefit of third persons,
at least one well-defined principle has emerged. In no case may a third party
beneficiary recover in New York unless the promise was made for his benefit,
expressly or by implication. 35 "The benefits of a contract are presumed to
enure to the parties thereto, and not to a third person in the absence of a clear
(1940) 26

CORNELL

MIcH. L. REv. 900.

L. Q. 130; Note (1940)

53 HARv. L. REV. 1060; Note (1940) 38

29United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 Fed. 73 (D. C. Pa. 1943) ; Franklin
Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N. J. Eq. 11, 29 A. (2d) 854 (1943); Laufersweiler v. Richmond, 22 Ohio Op. 265 (Prob. Ct. 1942).
301943 REPORT; REcOmM1ENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF LAw REvIsION CoflmIssIoN [Legis.
Doc. (1943) No. 65 (M)]; Foley, Inheritance Law Changes (1943) 15 N. Y. STATE BAR
Ass'N BULL. 87.
31N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 24: "Where any United States savings bond is payable
to a designated person, whether as owner, co-owner or beneficiary, and such bond is not
transferable, the right of such person to receive payment of such bond according to its
terms, and the ownership of the money so received, shall not be defeated or impaired by
any statute or rule of law governing transfer of property by will or gift or on
intestacy. ...."

321n re Deyo's Estate, - Misc. -, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 379 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
331d. at 387.
s4ld.
at 386.
S5Dreyer v. Hyde, 251 N. Y. 450, 167 N. E. 583 (1929) ; Beveridge v. N. Y. Electric
Rr. Co., 112 N. Y. 1, 19 N. E. 489 (1889); Levine v. Meitzel, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 561
(City Ct. 1942) ; Aldine Printing Co. v. National Delivery Ass'n., Inc., 145 Misc. 608,
260 N. Y. Supp. 553 (City Ct. 1931) ; Leary v. New York Central Railroad Co., 212 App.
Div. 689, 209 N. Y. Supp. 575 (3d Dep't. 1925).
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intent to that effect." 36 In creditor beneficiary 37 and public contract s cases,
the courts will imply in law an intent to benefit, if the relati.on of the parties
warrants it. In "donee" beneficiary cases, however, an express or impliedin-fact intent is insisted upon. In any case,'the rights of the third persons

are only those which were intended by the contracting parties. 39
The American Law -Institute considered this limitation to intended donee
beneficiaries sufficient protection to the parties to the contract from intervention by obtrusive strangers. 40 The insistence on a legal or moral obligation
to the beneficiary contributes nothing, and in many cases results in injustice.
It is suggested that the adoption of the Restatement definition of a donee
beneficiary by the New York courts would end the confusion, as the adoption
of the Restatement definition of a creditor beneficiary has done in Pennsylvania. 41 Some New York decisions already have recognized the importance
of "practical utility over technical subtlety" ;42 others have not. An opinion
from the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its function of "settling the
law" 43 would be welcome.
Constance Knowles Eberhardt

Corporations: Constitutional law: Limitations upon state's authority to
amend corporate charters.-A stockholder sued the corporation and its
directors to compel distribution of a' surplus resulting from the reduction of its capital stock affected pursuant to Section 36, subdivision 15,
of the New York Stock Corporation Law. By an amendment to this
section enacted subsequent to the creation of the defendant corporation
such funds could be used for any purpose for which surplus could be used.1
36

Safran v. Westrich, 136 Misc. 81, 83, 240 N. Y. Supp. 238, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1930), noted
in 37(1930) YALE L. J. 1217.
Wales v. Ripperger, 262 App. Div. 1062, 30,N. Y. S. (2d) 233 (4th Dep't. 1941).
3
sWilson v. Costich, note 15 supra.
39
Morgan v. Echo. Mach. Corp., 239 App. Div. 346, 267 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1st Dep't
1933)
; 1 WILSTON, CONTRACTS (Williston & Thompson, rev. ed., 1936) § 364A.
40
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1936) § 133.
4
'Commonwealth v. Great American Indemnity Co., 312 Pa. 183, 167 Atl. 793 (1933).
The Restatement definition was adopted with qualifications in Graybar Electric Co. v.
Seaboard
Surety Co., 157 Misc. 275, 283 N. Y. Supp. 522 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
42
Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 237, 120 N. E. 639, 640 (1918), Z A. L. R. 1187,
1193 (1919).
43
CARDozo, JURIsDIcTIoN OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (1903) § 6.
'Laws 1939, c. 334. By an amendment in 1940, the section was renumbered and now
appears as subdivision 16. The applicable section reads as follows:
"§ 36. Changes in respect to shares, capital stock or capital
16. If it be proposed to reduce the amount of capital pursuant to paragraph (G), the
certificate shall provide that the surplus, if any, resulting from such reduction shall be
available for any one or more of the following purposes: (a) to be used for any purpose
for which surplus may be used; or (b) to be reserved and used for specified purposes;
or (c) to be returned to the stockholders, according to their respective rights, at the
times and in the mariner specified."

1943]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The court ordered this surplus to be distributed among stockholders as of
the date of the reduction in capital in accordance with their respective shares,
holding that the 1939 amendment permitting a retention of surplus created
by a reduction in capital could not apply since the right of the shareholders
to the return of the capital was a right which vested in them when the corporation was formed, and the legislature was without power to alter or to permit
alteration of this right without the consent of all stockholders. Jay Ronald
Co., Inc. v. Marshall Mortgage Corporation,- App. Div. -, 40IN. Y. S.
(2d) 391 (1st Dep't. 1943).
In a similar case a Delaware corporation burdened by accumulated unpaid
dividends on its preferred stock merged with its wholly-owned dummy subsidiary to affect a recapitalization which would wipe out accumulated dividends.
Plaintiff, a preferred stockholder, sought to enjoin the merger. The district
court denied the injunction and dismissed the complaint. 2 The circuit court
of appeals affirmed. Since the right of the plaintiff to accumulated dividends
on preferred stock is not a vested property right in view of the power of selfamendment given to the defendant by Section 26 of the Delaware Corporation
Law, 3 there is no violation of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution ;4
and since the plan of recapitalization was fair, there was no violation of the
due process clause.n Hence the stockholder's right to accumulated dividends
could be altered by merger. Hottenstein et al. (Moore et al., Intervenors)
v. York Ice Machih Corporation,136 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
The decisions in the instant cases raise again the question: What are the
limitations upon the power of a state through amendment of a corporate
charter to alter or vary the rights of stockholders previously acquired thereunder?
The problem has been one of growing importance and complexity since the
decision in the famous Dartmouth College case6 enunciating the principle that
a corporate charter constitutes a contract between the state and the corporation
and that subsequent state legislation altering the charter would violate the
constitutional provisions against the impairment of contracts. Mr. Justice
Story in his concurring opinion asserted that a state could avoid the constitutional restriction of the contract clause by reserving to itself the power to
amend or repeal the charter and by granting charters subject to that express
reservation.6" Following this dictum most of the states reserved to themselves
power to amend corporate charters. These express reservations of state con245 F. Supp. 436 (D. C. Del. 1942).
3

DEL. RFV. CODE 1935 "§ 2058.

Any
...

Sec. 26.

Certificate of Incorporation; How amended

corporation of this state . . . may . . . amend its Certificate of Incorporation
.. . by increasing or decreasing its authorized capital stock or reclassifying the same,
by changing the number, par value, designations, preferences, or relative, participating,
optional, or other special rights of the shares ....
4U. S. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 reads as follows :. "No state shall . . . pass any . . .
Law impairing the obligation of Contracts. .... "
BU. S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIV " . . - nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
" See also N. Y. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 6.
......
or property, without due process of law
liberty,
6
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819).
6*Id. at 712.
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trol appear either in state constitutions 7 or in the general corporation laws 8
tor both.
Although the contract theory of the Dartmouth College case has been
severely criticized,9 it is a notion which still prevails in contemporary judicial
thought. It has been said that the charter of a corporation also represents a
contract among the stockholders as distinguished from the contract between
the state and the corporation.' 0 As a contract between the state and the
corporation, the better view would seem to be that the charter may be amended
without violation of the contract clause, since the presence of an express reservation by the state of that power at the time the charte' is granted constitutes
a term of the contract." Any other view would appear to be inconsistent with
the entire doctrine of reserve power and render nugatory the dictum in the
Dartmouth College case upon the strength of which many states have reserved
the power to amend corporate charters.
As respects the legislative power to amend a corporate charter so as to
alter rights among stockholders, there exists a great difference of opinion.' 2
Some courts seem to view the charter as representing three contracts, one
between the corporation and the state, one between stockholders and the state,
and one among stockholders, the latter being beyond the scope of a state's
reserve power to amend.'" Others view the charter as one contract, but reach
the same result by holding that the state may not under its reserve power in
any manner vary the rights of stockholders among themselves. 14 Still others
take the position that the state may alter phases of the charter involving the
rights between stockholders in which public interests are involved, but that
"An example of this type of legislative control appears in the New York State Constitution. N. Y. CONST. Art. X, § 1 provides: "Corporations may be fotmed under general
laws; ... All general laws and special acts passed pursuant to this section may be altered
from time to time or repealed."
8N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 5, "The charter of every corporation shall be subject to
alteration, suspension and repeal in the discretion of the legislature." Powers of. selfamendment appear in N. Y. Stock Corporation Law H§35 and 36. These sections allow
the corporation to make changes with respect to corporate powers or purposes or number
of directors and also to vary the amount of or reclassify its shares of capital stock. In
some
instances a two-thirds vote is necessary; in others a majority is sufficient.
9
STEVENS ON CORPORA-TIONS (1936) § 21; Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments t6 Corporate Charters (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 585, 593. For the derivation
and early development of the doctrine see 9 HOLDSWORTE, HISTORY OF THE EiTGLISH LAW
(1926)
46.
0
' Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 513, 91 Pac. 369, 374 (1907); Avondale

Land Co. v. Shook, 170 Ala. 379, 54 So. 268 (1911).
ilSt. Louis, I. I. and S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 19 Sup. Ct. 419 (1899);
Hollender v. Rochester Food Products Corp., 242 N. Y. 490, 152 N. E. 271 (1926), aff'g
1242 Misc. 130, 207 N. Y. Supp. 319 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
1 See 7 FLETcHER, COR'OATIONS (1931) § 3695.
13Wilmington Railroad v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264 (U. S. 1871); Tyler v. Dane County,
Wis., 289 Fed. 843 (D. C. W. D. Wis. 1923); Larabee v. Dolley, 175 Fed. 365, 390
(C. C. D. Kan. 1909).
'14Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel, 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. C. R. I. 1929) ; Matter
of Mount Sinai Hospital, 250 N. Y. 103, 164 N. E. 871 (1928), aff'g In re Mt. Sinai
Hospital, 128 Misc. 476, 219 N. Y. Supp. 505 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
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the reserve5 power may not be exercised where private interests alone are
concerned.'
6
This distinction seems too impractical.' Where powers of self-amendment
are conferred upon a percentage of shareholders it is difficult to understand
why in such a situation each shareholder may not be held to have assumed
as a term of his contract with other shareholders the risk of subsequent change
quite as much as he assumes the risk of change in the contract between the
corporation and the state.' 7 Accordingly, it is submitted that the restrictions
of the contract clause should not apply in any instance where the state has
reserved the power to amend the corporate charter or where such power is
delegated to a number of shareholders.
But the passage of the fourteenth amendment gave rise to an additional
constitutional limitation on the reserve power of the state to amend charters.
This power has been held by many courts not to extend to vested rights in
property because such rights are within the protection of the due process clause
in contract are held to be within the
in the same manner as vested rights
protection of the contract clause. 18
15Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907), and cases cited therein.
'6Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142 Atl. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928). See 7 FLETcaE,
CoRpORATIONS (1931) § 3679, where it is suggested that the confusion which exists may
be attributable to "the difficulty of defining the line of demarcation between what constitutes a matter of public as distinguished from one of, private interest in corporate
activities."
The idea that the reserved power may touch the "contract" between the state and
corporation but not the "contract" among shareholders is criticized on the ground that
any change must of necessity affect stockholders as well as the corporation. (1936) 3 U.
OF CHr. L. REv. 327, 328, discussing Keller v. Wilson & Co., 180 Atl. 584 (Del. Ch. 1935).
17 Hinckley v. Schwarzchild & Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. Supp. 357
(1st Dep't. 1905) ; Winfree v. Riverside Cotton Mills, 113 Va. 717, 75 S.E. 309 (1912),
where the court said at page 722, 311: " . . . the provision that corporate charters are
to be held subject to the requirements, terms and conditions of the constitution and of
any laws passed in pursuance thereof, is not limite4 to the relations between the state
and the corporation, but applies as well to the relationsM between th state and the stockthe corporation and the stockholders, and between the stockholders themselves."
holders,
l 8 Public Serv. Comm. of Puerto Rico v. Havemeyer, 296 U. S.506, 56 Sup. Ct. 360
(1935) ; Sears v. City of Akron, 246 U. S.242, 248, 38 Sup. Ct. 245, 247 (1917) ; Lake
Shore, etc., Railway Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684, 698, 19 Sup. Ct. 565, 572 (1898).
An amendment which will not "

.

.

.

impair the object of the grant, or any right vested

under the grant, and which the legislature may deem necessary to . . . protect the rights
of the public or of the corporation, its 'stockholders or creditors . . . " is within the
power of the tsate. Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46, 52, 21 Sup. Ct. 21, 23
reserve
(1900).
See also Yoakam v. Providence-Biltmore Hotel, 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. R. 1.1929);
Note (1930) 44HARv. L. Rav. 656; Davis Louisville Gas and Electric Company, 16 Del.
Ch. 157, 142 Atl. 654 (1928) ; Note (1929) 29 COL. L. Ray. 88; Ii. re Mt. Sinai Hospital,
250 N. Y. 103, 16,4 N. E. 871 (1928) ; Wasau St. Ry. Co. v. Bancroft, 148 Wis. 124, 134
N. W. 330 (1912).
A state may not destroy rights or deprive a corporation or its stockholders of their
and
property under the guise of exercising the amending power. Superior Water, Light
v. Essex
Power Co. v. Superior, 263 U. S.125, 44 Sup. Ct. 82 (1923) ; Commonwealth
Co., 13 Gray 239 (Mass. 1859). See Curran, Minority Stockholders and the Amendment
of Corporate Charters (1934) 32 Micg. L. REv. 743, and cases cited, 747-750.
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The use of this doctrine of vested rights has led to much confusion in
judicial thought.'2 It has been held to be a valid exercise of the reserve power
to pass an amendment which authorized the mutualization of a stock insurance
company by the enfranchisement of all policy holders. 20 An amendment
22
authorizing cumulative voting 2 ' or a change in stockholders' voting rights
a
which
allows
pass
an
amendment
is lawful. It is likewise permissible to
majority of stockholders to assess holders of full-paid stock23 or to convert
par value stock into stock of no par value. 24 In these situations the courts
view the rights involved either as contingent or as temporarily vested subject
to changes in the governing statute.
An amendment authorizing the corporation to postpone the date for redemption 6f its preferred stock impairs the stockholder's contract right and
violates the due process clause.2 Where eighty per cen of the entire stock
of a corporation is common stock and twenty per cent is preferred, all shares
having equal voting powers, any attempt tQ reduce the common stock and
thereby to decrease the stockholder's voice in management constitutes an
interference with a vested interest ubject to constitutional protection.2 6
The holding in the Hottenstein case that the right to accumulated dividends
is not a vested right is supported by courts of other jurisdictions.2 7 Delaware
19flavison and Thompson v. Parke, Austin and Lipscomb, Inc., et al., 285 N. Y. 500,

35 N. E. (2d) 618 (1941).
Note (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 537, 538, noting Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del.
Ch. 391, 190 AI. 115 (1936). A summary of the treatment of the problem by the courts
of Delaware illustrates the confusion. In the Keller case and in Consolidated Filn
Industries v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 AtI. 489 (197), the supreme court of Delaware held in effect that accrued dividends could not be adjusted under Section 26 of the
General Corporation Law (see note 3 supra). The right to such dividends was treated

as vested due to the passage of time; cancellation of them could not be sanctioned as

an amendment to the corporate charter. One year later a similar attempt to deprive
preferred stockholders of their accrued dividends, this time through merger with a subsidiary, was thwarted. Havender v. Federal United Corporation, 2 A. (2d) 143, 146-147
(Del. Ch. 1938), aff'd on rearguinent, 6 A. (2d) 618 (Del. Ch. 1939). In 1940 the
Delaware Supreme Court reversed on appeal. Federal United Corporation v. Havender,
11 A. (2d) 331 (D'el. Ch. 1940). Although the method used in the Keller case was
an attempted charter amendment while a merger was involved in the Havender case, this
would not seem to afford sufficient basis for the difference in result. "1f the right is a
vested right of property, protected by constitutional guarantees the holder can be as little
deprived of it by merger or consolidation under Section 26." Hottenstein v. York Ice
Machinery Co., 136 F. (2d) 944, 950 (1943). It is possible that this indecision is the
result of (1) a formal adherence to the meaningless test of "vested rights" and (2) an
attempt to achieve a result economically beneficial to business enterprise despite the
limitations customarily imposed upon the amending power when vested rights are involved.
2OLord v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443 (1909).
21
v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46, 21 Sup. Ct. 21 (1898).
2 2Looker
Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 478 (U. S. 1872).
23
St. Louis Mining and Milling Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464 (1912).
24 Somerville v.
Randle v. Winona Coal Co., 206 Ala. 254, 89 So. 70 (1921). On the general topic,
see25Note (1928) 14 CORNEu L. Q. 85.
Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 643 (1929) ; Sutton v. Globe Knittin g Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267 N. W. 815 (1936).
26Page v. American & British Manufacturing Co., 129 App. Div. 346, 113 N. Y. Supp.
7342 7 (1st Dep't. 1908).
Johnson v. Lamprecht, 30 N. E. (2d) 1019 (1937), aff'd, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. E.
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courts, however, had consistently held
that such a right was vested. 28 This
29
states.
other
in
view is maintained
While the "vested rights" approach to the problem is the traditionally
accepted one, to conclude that a right is within the protection of the due process
and contract clauses because it is vested seems to assume the very point in
issue. 30 To formulate any rule capable of universal application under a theory
which depends largely upon the tenuous distinction befween vested and nonvested rights seems impossible. Such a test lacks substance and cannot possibly
serve as a guide to decision especially where
the courts applying it are not in
31
accord as to the meaning of the term.
It has already been stated that as a general rule where a state has by constitutional amendment or statutory enactment reserved to itself or conferred
upon shareholders the power to amend the corporate charter the exercise of
that power should not be condemned as a violation of the contract clause of
the Federal Constitution. The due process clause, however, still constitutes a
positive check upon the power of amendment.32 The imposition of this constitutional restriction alone would grant a sufficient protection to individual
rights, and at the same time, permit a state to exercise that degree of control
over the objects of its creation which was authorized by the decision in the
Dartmnouth College case.
The test under the due process clause should be one directed at the reasonableness of the change in the charter authorized by the legislature. 3a Thus, if
the proposed change provides for new rights for the rights taken away under
the amendment 34 and the statute affords a right of appraisal and purchase at
(2d) 127 (1938).

See

BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN

CORPORATION AND

PRIVATE

PROPERTY
(1933) 150.
28
See cases discussed
20

in note 19 supra.
Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 101 N. J.Eq. 554,
139 Atl. 50 (1927) ; Patterson v. Hosiery Mills, 216 N. C. 728, 6 S.E. (2d) 531 (1940)
Patterson v. Hosiery Mills, 214 N. C. 806, 200 S. E. 906 (1939).
z"Note (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 537, 538; (1936) 3 U. OF Cii. L. Rav. 327, 328.
31For a discussion of various instances in which the term "vested right" has been used
as a basis for decision, see Davison v. Parke, Austin and Lipscomb Inc., 285 N. Y. 500,
508-509, 35 N. E. (2d) 618, 622 (1941), where the court speaking of the New York
statute allowing changes in preferential rights of stock said,

"

.

.

. it seems that only

confusion results from saying that 'vested rights' are not within the contemplation of
the statute. .'. . The inadequacy of the 'vested rights' test is further demonstrated by the
fact that new stock may be issued with preferential rights to the assets of the corporation
upon dissolution and to dividends superior to the preferential rights of the then outstanding shares . . .even superior to the right of preferred stockholders to dividends in
arrears .....
The judicial problem is not whether, a particular preferential right is vested
or not, but rather what was the legislative intent as to it."
This language would seem to apply with equal force to other instances of alleged infringement
of private rights asserted to be "vested."
2
3S
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U. S. 629, 56 Sup. Ct. 611 (1936) ; Coombs
v. Goetz, 285 U. S. 434, 52 Sup. Ct. 435 (1932); Breslav v. New York Queens and
Electric Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932 (2d Dep't. 1936), af'd. inem. 273
N. Y. 141, 7 N. E. (2d) 708 (1937). STEVENS or CORPOATIONS (1936) § 199.
33Shields v.,Ohio, 95 U. S.319, 324 (1877) : "The power of alteration and amendment
is not without limit. The alteration must be reasonable .... Sheer oppression and wrong
be inflicted under the guise of amendment and alteration."
cannot
34
Such a view would seem to be consistent with business expediency. See Note (1942)
ST.-JOHN'S L. REV. 230.
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the election of the dissenter in lieu of his substituted rights, and the amendment is one bona fide- accepted by the necessary percentage of shareholders
as productive of the best interests of the corjoration, the minority should not
be heard to complain that the change violates the due process clause.35
This principle was recognized in the Hottenstein case,3 6 after the court
overcame the obstacle presented by the vested rights theory. Applied to the
Jay Ronald case the test of reasonableness might have produced a different
result. Every reduction in corporate capital does not indicate that the fund
thus created as surplus is of no further use to the business as a going concern
and that it should be distributed to the shareholders. The retention of the
surplus in the net worth account of the corporation enhances the market value
of the shares and does not disturb the value of each shareholder's equity. This
same value should be realized upon sale of the stock. At any rate, it is difficult
to see how the dissenting minority incur any substantial loss as a result of
the retention of the surplus by the corporation.
A change in the general law such as that exemplified by the J6,y Ronald
case would seem to be permissible even if applied retroactively. The legislature
should have the power to adapt existing corporation laws to changing economic
conditions. To hold that the legislature is bound by laws existing when a
corporation is formed even though a majority or other required percentage of
shareholders affected approves the amendment seems to allow the minority,
without good cause shown, to block changes which are both necessary and
beneficial.3 7 A word from the United States Supreme Court defining clearly
the exact scope of the reserve power to amend corporate charters and the
test to be applied would be welcome.
John S. De Jose

Life insurance: Administration of proceeds of policies: Arrangements
for deferred payment.-In recent years, insured persons have made various
arrangements for having the proceeds of their life insurance policies administered over extended periods. The problem of defining the legal nature of
35

Durfee v. Old Colony and F. River Co., 5 Allen 230, 246 (Mass. 1862) : "Having by

virtue of the relation which subsists between himself and the corporation as a holder of
shares, assented to the terms of the original act of incorporation, he cannot ,be heard to
say that he will not be bound by a vote of the majority of the stockholders accepting an
amendment or alteration of the charter made in pursuance of an express authority reserved
to the legislature, and by which such acceptance has become binding on the corporation."
The case hasj been criticized on the grofnd that it expresses an erroneous conception of
the nature of the reserved power to amend. 13 FLETCHER, CoRpo1TioNs (1934) 85-87.
36136 F. (2d) 944, 950 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943),
37For a discussion of minority 'rights, see Curran, Minority Stockholders and the
Amendnment of Corporate Charters (1934) 32 MicH. L. REV. 743.
'HORTON, POWER OF AN INSURED TO CONTROL THE PROCEEDS OF His POLICmS (1926);
Van Hecke, Insurance Trnsts-The Insurer as Trustee (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. 21; Land,

Life Insuraiwe Option Settlements-Trusts or Debts (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 32; Note,
Deferred Settlements in Life Insuraice--"Trusts"or "Debts" (1927) 36. YALE L. J. 394;
Note, Life Insurance Options (1943) 56 HARv. L. REv. 1147.
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these arrangements has caused considerable difficulty.2
There are available to insured persons3 three general types of arrangements:
1. The insurance company on the death of the insured pays the proceeds
in a lump sum to either the named beneficiary or the assignee of the policy.
After payment the insurance company is no longer involved in the transaction,
but the payee, under a trust agreement with the insured, holds the proceeds
in trust for designated cestuis que trustent. To set up such a trust, the insured
transfers to the trustee an insurance policy, the proceeds of which on its
maturity are to comprise the 'corpus of the trust. 4 If other property is transferred by the insured to the trustee along, with the policy to provide a source
of income out of which the future premiums of the policy are to be paid, the
trust is funded. 5 Otherwise the trust is unfunded, 6 for the premiums must
then be paid from an outside source. Many problems have arisen out of the

insurance trust,1 but they are beyond the scope of this note.

2. More difficult are the second and third arrangements, where the insurance company agrees to administer the proceeds on the death of the insured
according to the terms of an agreement between it and the insured. In the
agreement one of the following modes of settlement is usually adopted :8 (a)
2
Land, loc. cit. supra note 1. For that matter, the legal nature of the relationship
between a life insurance company and a policy holder has not been without difficulty.
Note, The Relationship between a Life Insmrance Company and a Policy Holder (1939)
48 YALE L. J. 839.
3If the insured person should die without having selected an available policy option,
may the payee of the proceeds elect? He may (a) if the terms of the policy do not
prevent him, and (b) should he receive the proceeds as trustee, if the investment under
state law is a proper trust investment. First Trust Company of St. Paul v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 204 Minn. 244, 283 N: W. 236 (1939) (where the election by the
beneficiary-trustee was expressly permitted, by the terms of the trust) ; Latterman v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 280 N. Y. 102, 19 N. E. (2d) 978 (1939) (choice of option for
beneficiaries by their guardian held proper on ground that they received "a bundle of
contractual rights, which have certain very valuable options as a component part thereof.") ; Horton, The Testamentary Nature of Settlements of Life Insurance Elected by
the Beneficiary (1931) 17 CORNELL L. Q. 72; Note, Life Insurance Options (1943) 56
HAxv.
L. REv. 1147, 1155-1156.
4
Bogert, Funded Insurance Trusts and the Rule Against Accumulations (1924) 9
CORNELL L. Q. 113; Fraser, Personal Life Insurance Trusts in New York (1930) 16
CORNELL
5

L. Q. 19.

Bogert, loc. cit. supra note 4.
6Ibid.
7
The rule against perpetuities has been held to apply to the life insurance trust.
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. v. The von Hamm-Young Co., Ltd., 34 Haw. 288
(1937). Whether the life insurance trust is testamentary and within the Statute of Wills
is also a problem. Grahame, The Insurance Trust as Non-Testamentary Disposition
(1934) 18 MINN. L. REv. 391. In New York, by decision and later by statute, the rule
against accumulations does not apply to the funded trust. Matter of Hartman, 126 Misc.
862, 215 N. Y. Supp. 802 (Surr. Ct. 192 ) ; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 16. Bogert, loc.
ct. mtpra note 4; Fraser, loc. cit. supra note 4; Hanna, Some Legal Aspects of Life
Insurance
Trusts (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 346.
8
Land, op. cit. supra note 1, at 32-33. Statutes in nine jurisdictions expressly permit
retention of the proceeds by insurance companies in trust. CONiNT. GEN. STAT. (1930)
§ 4193; DEL. R v. CODE (1935) § 505; D. C. CODE (1940) § 35-720; ILL. ANN. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 73, § 853; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1940) § 4215; IOWA
CODE (1939) § 8674; ORE. Cozip. LAws ANN. (1940) § 101-517; VT. PUB. LAws (1933)
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periodic payments of interest, with payment of principal at end of a stated
period; (b) payment of principal and interest in installments over a stated
period; (c) payment of a stated number of installments of definite amounts,
with the possibility of an additional number if warranted by the earnings of
the company; (d) payment of fixed amounts for a stated period or for the
life of the beneficiary, whichever is longer. Combinations of these basic types
are not only possible but common. A minimum return, by way of interest is
frequently guaranteed. The agreement under the second arrangement is called
a "trust agreement," and refers to the insurance company as administering the
proceeds "as trustee."
3. The third arrangement is similar to the second in all respects except
that its terminology resembles that of a contract rather than that of a trust.
The identical modes of settlement possible under the second arrangement are
also the basic types here.9
Because trust terminology is used in the second arrangement, it does not
follow that a trust results.10 Even if the insurance company has capacity to
act as trustees under statute or charter," there can be no traditional trust
because of the absence of certain technical requisites: (a) no segregation of
the trust res from the general assets of the insurance company ;12 (b) the
§ 7014; Wis. STAT. (1941) § 206.39. The New York statute recognizes that the proceeds
may
be held under "a trust or other agreement." N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 15.
9
Van Hecke, op. cit. supra note 1, at 23; Land, op. cit. supra note 1, at 34. Statutes
in twenty-three jurisdictions permit the insurance company to administer policy proceeds.
See statutes cited in note 8 supra; also ALA. CODE ANN. (1940) tit. 28, § 4; CODES OF
CAL. (Deering, 1937) §§ 10132, 10171; CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 87, §§ 64,
167; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) § 40-414a; MASS. GEN. LAWs (1932) c. 175,
§ 119A; MixN. STAT. (1941) § 61.31; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 5172; NEB. Corn'.
STAT. (Dorsey, 1929) § 44-1118; Oio CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1936) § 9398-1;
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 40, § 514; R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1938) c. 153,
§ 14; T-x. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 5068a; WYo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, Supp.
1940)
§ 57-236A.
10 Crossman Co. v. Ranch, 263 N. Y. 264, 273, 188 N. E. 748, 751:
"The obligation of the insurance company constitutes a debt from the company
to . . . the beneficiary, under the policy. Although the word trust is used, the
agreement is not in fact a trust agreement. The monthly payments which the
company contracted to pay are definitely fixed in amount. They are not income on
personal property. They constitute deferred payments which the company agreed
to make to the beneficiary in consideration of the receipt at the death of insured of
... the face value of the policy."
See also Matter of Nires, 290 N. Y. 78, 48 N. E. (2d) 268 (1943).
XSee note 8 supra.
' 2 Statutes in Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachus-etts, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming permit insurance companies holding proceeds to mingle them. In the absence of statute,
commingling could be expressly permitted by the parties. Land, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 45; Bogert, Some Recent Developments in the Law of Trusts (1929) 23 ILL. L. REv.
749, 754; cf. Epstein, Insuranwe Settlement Agreements and the Ride Against Perpetuities
(1939) 73 U. S. L. Rxv. 441, 460:
"There is, of course, no specific investment allocated to a particular policy or
beneficiary. But this does not preclude the existence of a trust. The funds of the
insurance company are in their entirety impressed with a trust."
Note, The Life Insurance Trust (1937) 50 H~Av. L. REv. 511; Note, Deferred Settleinerts in Life nusurance---"Trsts" or "Debts" (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 394, 399-401 (citing
examples of trust without segregated res).
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insurance company's holding in trust its own obligation;13 (c) the provision
for fixed payment of interest rather than income ;14 and (d) the absolute nature
of the insurance company's obligation to make payment. 15
Under either arrangement, the conduct of the insurance company is substantially the same. On the death of the insured it credits and closes its
account as insurer, charges itself with a new liability payable out of its general
assets toward the beneficiaries, and issues certificates to them. In neither case
are the proceeds segregated from the company's general assets, which are
invested by the company within the limited class of securities approved for
life insurance company investment by statute. Out of these general assets payments pursuant t6 the selected mode of settlement are periodically made.1 6
The result-the insured hopes to accomplish through either device is the same:
the deferment of the payment of the insurance proceeds to the beneficiaries
according to their probable need and ability to handle the funds. There thus
appears no justific.tion for legally differentiating the second arrangement
from the third."1
The tendency tinfortunately has been to attempt to fit the second and third
arrangement into the Procrustean Bed of an existing category, most frequently
a trust' s or a debt,19 and apply the traditional incidents. If the latter do not
happen to coincide with the obvious desires of the insured, there is a choice
between being logical and following the technical theory or accomplishing
those desires and, by allowing exceptions, recognizing the inadequacy of the
theory. The solution, which is more of a, means than an end, is to treat the
' 3Bogert, loc. cit. supra note 12; Land, op., cit. supra note 1, at 46. But trusts have
been found where the trustee holds in trust its own obligation. Note, Deferred Settlements
in. Life Insuraiwe---"Trusts" o?' "Debts" (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 394, 397-399.
' 4 Land, op. cit. supra note 1, at' 46; Note, Deferred Settlements in Life Inmrance"Trusts" or "Debts" (1927) 36 YALz L. J. 394, 401-402. In many cases a minimum
rate of interest is guaranteed, to be supplemented by additional amounts as warranted
by the insurance company's earnings. Substantially, then, the beneficiaries receive
"income."
15 Land, opl. cit. supra note 1, at 46. The obligation is only as absolute as the solvency
of the company permits. . Then, too, payments by a trustee can be made more certain by
bonding
him.
' 6 Van Hecke, op. cit. supra note 1, at 23-24.
17Van Hecke, op. cit. mpra note 1, at 27; Note, Life Insurance Options (1943) 56
HARv. L. REv. 1147; cf. Matter of Nires, 290 N. Y. 78, 48 N. E. (2d) 268 (1943).
' 8johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) ; New
York Life Ins. Co. v. O'Brien, 27 F. (2d) 773 (D. C. D. Mich. 1927), appeal dismissed
on stip. 22 F. (2d) 1016, 1017 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927), noted in (1929) 77 U. oF PA. L.
Rav. 430; Holowaty v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 282 Ill. App. 584 (1935), criticized in Notes (1936) 14 CHi-KENT L. REv. 166, (1936) 30 ILL. L. Rav. 942; Michaelson
v. Sokolove, 169 Md. 529, 182 Atl. 458 (1936) ; Cronbach v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 153
Tenn. 362, 284 S. W. 72 (1925), noted in (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 394; Epstein, op. cit.
supra
note 12.
19 Pierowich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 282 Mich: 118, 275 N. W. 789 (1937);
McLaughlin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 112 N. J. Eq. 344,
164 Atl. 579 (1933) ; Matter of Nires, 290 N. Y. 78,'48 N. E. (2d) 268 (1943) ; Holmes
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 288 N. Y. 106, 41 N. E. (2d) 909 (1942) ;
Matter of Scott, .274 N. Y. 538, 10 N. E. (2d) 538 (1937), cert. den. 302 U. S. 721,
58 Sup. Ct. 41 (1937) ; Crossman Co. v. Rauch, 263 N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 748 (1934).
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insurance settlement as sui ge.eris.20 The problem of defining its legal nature
remains.
That the New York rule against perpetuities 2' does not apply to insurance
settlements was recently settled. In Hohes v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co.,22 the insured before, his death nominated his second wife and
'two nephews as beneficiaries under three life insurance policies. In the exercise of an optional method of settlement, he directed that the proceeds be left
on deposit with the insurance company and that interest be paid quarterly to
his second wife during her lifetime, and after her death or if she should predecease him, to the two nephews until the elder or survivor attained the age
of thirty-five, and that thereafter the principal be paid to the nephews or the
survivor. The former wife, as a judgment creditor of the insured, sued to
recover the proceeds of the policies on, among othes,2 the ground that the
insured's direction constituted an unlawful suspension of the. power of alienation. The court held that the stipulated payments were'not income on personal property but were deferred payments of a debt from the company to
the beneficiary under the policy. Conceding that if the policy proceeds constituted a trust fund, the directions of the insured would have been void under
the rule against perpetuities, the court concluded that the rule did not apply.
Regardless of the nature of the rule against perpetuities at common law,24
it is clear that the New York rule, in attempting to preserve the alienability
of property, makes void in its inception any arrangement whereby interests in
property might possibly vest or the power of alienation might be suspended
beyond a period measured by two lives in being at the time of its effective
date or for any period in gross. 25 Even if the beneficiaries in the Holmes case
enjoyed proprietary as distinguished from contractual interests, the scheme
there did not involve the vesting of future rights at too remote a'lime. All
interests bad tor vest within a period measured by two lives in being at the
time both of the selection of the option and of the insured's death. 2 Nor
20Davis, Spendthrift Trusts in Life Izsuraice Policies (1925) 5 B. U. L. REV. 91, 99;
-Note, Deferred Settlements in Life Instrance---"Trusts" or. "Debts" (1927) 36 YALE
L.21J. 394, 403; Note, Life Inmranwe Options (1943) 56 HARV. L. REv. 1147.
N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42; N. Y. -PERs. PROP. AW § 11.
22288 N. Y. 106, 41 N. E. (2d) 909 (1942), approved in Note (1942) 42 COL. L. REv.
1221;
Note (1943) 9 CONTEMP. L. PAM. 44.
23
"The serious problem" ,presented by the appeal concerned the application of Section
52 of the N. Y. Domestic Relations Law prior to its repeal in March, 1927, by Section
55(a) of the Insurance Law, 288 N. Y. at 110-114, 41 N. E. (2d) at 911-913 (1942).
Neither the special term nor the appellate division mentioned the rule against perpetuities.
23 N. Y. S. (2d) 36 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; 262 App. Div. 99, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 94 (4th Dep't.
1941). The briefs for both sides filed with the Court of Appeals dealt with suspension
of the power of alienation by the insurance settlement. Brief for Plaintiff-appellant,
44-60, Brief for Respondents, 36-40,,Holmes v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
2882 4 N. Y. 106, 41 N. E. (2d) 909 (1942).
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST Pm'EmruiTIEs (4th ed. 1942) c. 1; 1936 REPORT, REcoasM[ENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE LAw REvIsION COMmissiON [N. Y. Legis. Doc. (1936)

No.
2 5 65 (H) ] 512.
Matter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909).
26
If a power of revocation is not retained, the permissible period should run from the
date of the execution of the agreement; if a power is retained, from the date of the death
of the insured. Land, op. cit. supra note 1, at 48.
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were the beneficiaries forbidden under the arrangement from alienating their
interests or joining with the insurance company in terminating the arrangement.27 The power of alienation, therefore, was not suspended.
The same statute in New York which makes most trusts spendthrift and
hence subject to the suspension of the power of alienation restriction of the
rule against perpetuities distinguishes arrangements whereby "the proceeds
of a life insurafice policy . . .are left with the insurance company under a
trust or, other agreement." 28 The benefits accruing under the latter are made
inalienable only "if the parties to the trust or other agreement so agree." 29
In the Holves case the insurance company and the insured did not so agree.
The decision on the perpetuities point in the Hohnes case, therefore, was
undoubtedly correct, but the reasoning was questionable.
The rule of perpetuities is a rule of property and does not apply to contracts.3 0 Even if the settlement provision in the insurance contract be specifically enforceable, 3 ' no equitable interest in rem would arise and afford a
sufficient proprietary interest upon which to base the application of rules of
property.32 Despite the absence of an orthodox proprietary interest, it is sub27

Even if the beneficiaries' interests had been inalienable, it is doubtful whether the

result would have been different since the court viewed the arrangement as a debt
involving no proprietary interests. The precise holding was that no power of alienation
was suspended since the interests of the beneficiaries were not inalienable either (a) because under a trust to receive and apply the income to their use, or (b) because the
insured
and the insurance company so agreed.
28N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAw § 15. Before this provision was added to the section in 1911,
the statutory limitation on the alienability of the interest of a beneficiary of a trust was
held not to apply to the interest of a beneficiary of the proceeds of a life insurance policy
payable in installments. Black v. New York Life Ins. Co., 126 N. Y. Supp. 334 (App.
Term, 1910). The court said at page 336: "It is a debt on the one hand and a claim
on29the other. That such a claim is assignable admits of no doubt."
The beneficts are exempt from attachment "either in the hands of the insurance
company or after their receipt by the judgment debtor." Crossman Co. v. Rauch, 248
App. Div. 758, 288 N. Y. Supp. 827 (2d Dep't. 1936). The beneficiaries may not protect
their interests from the claims of their creditors by having such a clause inserted after

the death of the insured. Matulka v. Van Roosbroeck, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 240 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1940). "Nothing more is necessary than that the wording of the 'trust or other
agreement' (Section 15) show an intent to come within a statute such as Section 15."
F. Frazier Jelke & Co. v. Greene, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 91, 93 (N. Y. City Ct. 1942). It
had been contended that the statute applied only to the "trust agreement" method.
HORTON, POWER OF AN INSURED TO CONTROL THE PRoCFE)S OF His POLICIES (1926)
59-60. This contention has been repudiated. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Lewis, 18
N. Y. S. (2d) 714 (N. Y. City Ct. 1939) ; Matter of Nires, 290 N. Y. 78, 48 N. E. (2d)
2683 (1943).
°Walsh v. Secretary of State for India, 10 H. L. Cas. 367, 11 Eng. Rep. R. 1068

(1863); Witham v. Vane (H. L. 1883),

CHALLIS'S LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

(3d ed.

1911) App. V, p. 440; Borland's Trustee v. Steel. Bros. & Co., Ltd., [1901] 1 Ch. 279;
GRAY,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942) § 329.
31
Latterman v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 280 N. Y. 102, 19 N. E. (2d) 978 (1939)
(where
option chosen by beneficiaries was specifically enforced).
32There is no specific property to which an equitable interest can attach. If there
were, a proprietary interest would be involved. London & S. W. Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch.

Div. 562 (1882);

GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST

PERPETUITIES

(4th ed. 1942) § 330.

Although void in a suit in equity for specific performance, such a contract has been held
valid in an action at law for damages. Worthing Corporation v. Heather [1906] 2 Ch.
532; GRAY, supra, at § 330.1.
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mitted that these arrangements so resemble dispositions of property that
property rules should to some extent apply.33
The proceeds are invested within the same general class of nonspeculative
securities as are trust funds.3 4 Instead of income from a segregated trust
corpus, the beneficiaries receive a guaranteed minimum return with the possibility of a greater return when justified by the company's earnings. 35 These
settlements compete with devices which have been recognized to be proprietary
in 'nature. In fact, the insurance settlement offers to settlors and
3 6 testators
most of the advantages of a trust with few of its disadvantages.
The conceptual basis for the decision in the Hohnes case was that the
insurance settlement involved a debtor-creditor relationship. This holding
has already had one unfortunate consequence in a subsequent New York case.
In Matter of Nires37 the insured had five life insurance policies. He made
agreements-two were "trust agreements"-with the insurance companies
whereby they were to accumulate interest on the proceeds until each beneficiary reached twenty-one. Thereupon the latter was to receive the accumulated sum and thereafter annual interest until the age of thirty-five when
the principal was payable. The proceeds, payments, and benefits were not
assignable, commutable, or subject to encumbrance or legal process. -Two of
the beneficiaries were destitute infant sons of the insured who had received
nothing under his will. Their guardian sought to have the income applied to
meet their present needs.3 8

The court recognizing that the directed accumu-

lation of income under a trust could be anticipated held that the arrangement
was only a debt. Three judges, conceding that the arrangement was a debt,
dissented on the ground that the arrangements were so analogous to trusts
that they were within the intention of the legislature when it gave the courts
power to anticipate benefits under an accumulation of income from personal
property.39
Holding that the insurance settlement is a contract precludes the application
to the device of other rules of property. The doctrine against restraints on
alienation40 since it, like the rule against perpetuities, is a property concept,
33
Note, Insurance Settlement Options (1943) 56 HARV. L. Rnv. 1147; Note (19 7)
50 H.Av. L. REv. 511, 516. Contra: Land, op. cit. supra note 1, at 46; Danziger, Does
theRule Against Perpetuities, and Do Statutes Modifying that Rule, Affect Life InsurPolicies and Their Proceeds? (1930) 4 Ass'N OF LIFE INS. Cousm 467.
ance
34
Note
(1937) 50 HuAv. L. Ruv. 511, 516.
35
Note, Deferred Settlenwnts in Life Imrance--"Trusts" or "Debts" (1927) 36 YALE
401-402.
394,
J.
L. 6
3 Timberg, Insuraiwe and Interstate Commerce (1941) 50 YALE L. 3. 959, 987-988.
37290 N. Y. 78, 48 N. E. (2d) 268 (1943).
38
Under N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 17:
"When a minor, for whose benefit a valid accumulation of the income of personal
property has been directed, shall be destitute of other sufficient means of support or
education, the supreme court, at special term in any case, or, if such accumulation
shall have been directed by a will, the surrogate's court of the county in which
such will shall have been admitted to probate, may, on the application of such minor
or his guardian, cause a suitable sum to be taken from the moneys accumulated or
directed to be accumulated, to be applied for the education or support of such minor."
39290
N. Y.' at 85, 48 N. E. (2d) at 272 (1943).,
4

0GRAY,

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

(2d ed. 1895).
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therefore, would not apply to the insurance settlement in New York. But
even if the doctrine were applied, the spendthrift provision so common in
insurance settlements should not be held to be within its prohibition.41 If the
spendthrift provision is authorized by statute, as it is in New York and most
states having large insurance companies, 42 the common law to the extent that
it would be inconsistent is abrogated. If the spendthrift provision in an agreement is not sanctioned by statute, its validity depends upon the application of
common law principles. Spendthrift provisions in trusts even in the absence
of statute have been generally upheld.4 3 On the same theory, spendthrift provisions in insurance settlements not expressly permitted by statute should
be upheld. 44 The fact that the inalienable interest of the cestui is equitable
while the nature of the beneficiary's interest under the insurance settlement
has not been fully defined, should not matter.
Since most settlement schemes direct accumulations, if at all, for periods
of minority only, the application of the rule against accumulations is of but
slight practical significance,4 5 even in states which restrict accumulations
most. 46 If the accumulation is directed to extend beyond the period allowed
by statute, the direction should be enforced only for the lawful period.
Although arrangements for the deferred payment of life insurance proceeds
are in widespread use, litigation in the field has been relatively slight.47 The
41
"But the purpose for which the restraint is created-may sanction it and this should
be the test applied." Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation silwe Gray
(1935) 48 HARv. L. Rav. 373, 406. Davis, Spendthrift Trusts in Life, Insurance Policies
(1925) 5 B. U. L. Rav. 91, 99; Van Hecke, op. cit. supra note 1, at 33-35. Contra:
GRISWOLD,
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1936) p. 101, n. 55.
42
N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 15. ALA. CODE ANN. (1940) tit. 28, § 4; CODES OF CAL.
(Deering, 1937) § 10132; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 87, §§ 64, 167; CONN.
GEN. STAT. (1930) § 4193; DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 505; D. C. CODE (1940) §§ 35-72a;
ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 73, § 853; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1940)
§ 39-4215; IowA CODE (1939) § 8674; KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) § 40414a; MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 175, § 119A; MINN. STAT. (1941) § 61.31; Miss.
ANN. CODE (1930) § 5172; NEB. COMP. STAT. (Dorsey, 1929) § 44-1118; OHIO CODE
ANN. (Throckmorton, 1936) § 9398-1; ORE. ComP. LAws ANN. (1940) § 101-517; PA.
STAT. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 40, § 514; R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. (1938) c. 153, § 14; TEX.
STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 5068a; VT. PUB. LAWS (1933) §§ 7012-7014; Wis. STAT.
(1941) § 206.39; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, Supp. 1940) § 57-236A. The

conflict of laws problem of choosing the applicable statute has apparently never arisen.
GRISWOLD,
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1936) §
43
GRiswoLD, SPENDTIiFT TRUSTS (1936)

113.

as principal beyond an unreasonable period.

At'common law, the limit was the common

§§ 55-58. Professor Griswold summarizes
on page 45: "On the basis of 'common law' authorities, therefore, there are twenty-five
states which uphold spendthrift trusts, while seven states reject them." Spendthrift
trusts in New York rest solely on statute. Id. at § 67. GRAY, R STRAINTS ON ALMNATION (2d ed. 1895) ; Costigan, Those Protective Trists Which Are Miscalled "Spendthrift Trusts" Re~xamined (1934) 22 CALIF. L. REV. 471.
4See note 41 supra.
45
Land, op. cit. supra note 1, at 49.
46
The rule against accumulations prohibits the accumulation of income for reinvestment
law permissible period for the rule against perpetuities. Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves.
Jr. 227, 31 Eng. Rep. R. 117 (Ch. 1799), 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. R. 1030 (H. L. 1805).
This
period has been generally shortened by statute. N. Y. PERS. PRoP. LAW § 16.
47
HORTON, POWER

OF AN INSURED TO CONTROL THE PROCEEDS OF

Introduction; Land, op. cit. supra note 1, at 35.

His POLICIES (1926)
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courts have two alternatives: (1) Fit' the arrangements into existing categories; or'(2) Recognize a new category having incidents which, within
reasonable limits, effectuate the desires of the insured. To effectuate those
desires, the insurance settlement should for some purposes be analogized to a
trust which it.greatly resembles and with which it is coming to compete. It
is conceivable that if the present trend of court decision in New York continues, trust companies will lose valuable business to insurance companies.
But there is no need to find a trust, nor indeed to carry the trust analogy
beyond the phases discussed to impose upon the insurance company the full
complement of trust duties. 48 ' As the "use" in the seventeenth century met the
inadequacies of the then existing law, 49 the insurance settlement, provided
that the courts follow the second 'alternative, will furnish a much needed
twentieth-century device for familial disposition. Should the courts fail, legislative direction is available.5 0
Harry George Henn

Taxation: Trusts: Taxation of family trusts.-In Helvering v. Stuart,
317 U. S. 154, 63 Sup. Ct. 140 (1942), the Supreme Court considered two
questions of great practical importance to those making financial provisions
for members of their families through the use of the trust device. These questions are: (1) When is income of a trust to be deemed income of the settlor
for.income tax purposes under the broad general definition of income contained
in- Section 22(a)1 of the Internal Revenue Code? (2) To what extent is the
income of a trust created for the benefit of minor children to be deemed the
income of the settlor for income tax purposes?
In 1930 John Stuart established a trust for each of his three children, the
youngest of whom had reached majority before the tax years in question, by
4
SNote, Life Insuraiwe Options (1943) 56 HARv. L. REv. 1147.
(1924) 407-480.
50A bill was introduced in the N. Y. Assembly (Int. No. 541) in 1940 limiting authorized
companies and residents from suspending the power of absolute ownership of life insurance
proceeds beyond one life in being at the death of the insured. Land, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 48. Cf. IowA CODE (1939) § 8674; ORE. ComP. LAws ANN. (1940) § 101-517 (insurance company by holding proceeds in trust does not thereby become subject to laws
relating to banks or trust companies; forms of trust agreements must be approved by
commissioner of insurance). Note (1942) 42 COL. L. Rav. 1221, 1224.
494 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

'Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code so far as pertinent provides:
"§ 22. Gross income
(a) General definition. "Gross income" includes gains, profits, and income
derived from salaries, wages, ,or compensation for personal service (including personal service as an officer ox employee of a State, or any political subdivision thereof,
or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of' the foregoing), of whatever
kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses,
commerce, or sales, or. dealings irk property, whether real or personal, growing out
of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent,
dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit,
or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever .... " 26 U. S. C.
§ 22 (1940).
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transferring to three trustees certain shares of the common stock of a corporation of which he was president. The trustees were directed to pay over and
distribute to the respective beneficiaries for fifteen years as much of the net
income of the trusts as they deemed advisable, and to add the undistributed
portion to the corpus. After the fifteen-year period, the entire income was to
be paid to the 'respective beneficiaries for life. In 1932 Douglas Stuart, the
brother of John Stuart, created similar trusts for each of his four minor children. The trustees were directed to apply as much of the income of the trusts
for the education, support, and maintenance of the minor children as seemed
advisable, the unexpended portion of the income to be added to the principal
of the trusts. Half the corpus of each trust was to be paid to the respective
beneficiaries as each reached the age of twenty-five; the remaining one-half, at
thirty.
Other provisions of all the trust indentures were similar. The trustees
named in each instrument were the taxpayer-settlor, his wife, and his brother.
Each settlor reserved the right to direct the trustees to sell all or part of the
principal of the trusts and to reinvest the proceeds in such other property as
the settlor might direct, and the right to withdraw the whole or any part of
the principal upon delivery of other property of equal market value satisfactory to the trustees. Each instrument gave the trustees other than the settlor
the power to alter, change, or amend the trust provisions by changing the
beneficiaries, by varying the distribution2dates of corpus or income, by changing
1
the trustees, or "in any other respect."1
Neither settlor included the income of the trusts which he had created in his
tax returns for 1934 and 1935. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
concluded that the income of each trust was taxable as income to the settlor
22(a), 166,3 and 167, 4 and assessed a
under Internal Revenue Code Sections
I
2
The ninth paragraph of each trust indenture contained this provision. Helvering v.
Stuart,
317 U. S. 154, 159, 63 Sup. Ct. 140, 143 (1942).
3
Section 166 provides:
"§ 166. Revocable trusts
Where at any time the power to revest in the grantor title to any part of the
corpus of the trust is vested(1) In the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not having a
substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or the income
therefrom, or
(2) In any person not having a sqbstantial adverse interest in the disposition
of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom, then the income of such part of
the trust shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor." 26 U. S. C.
§ 166 (1940).
4
Section 167 so far as pertinent provides:
"§ 167. Income for benefit of grantor
(a) Where any part of the income of a trust(1) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the incomd may be, held
or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor; or
(2) may, in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income, be distributed

to the grantor; or . . .

then such part of the income of the trust shall be included in computing the net
income of the grantor." 26 U. S. C. § 167 (1940).
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deficiency for the Years in question. The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the
deficiencies under Section 166 because the trustees, who did not have a "substantial adverse interest," 5 had the power of revesting the funds of the trusts
in the grantors.6 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that, under the applicable Illinois law, there was no power in the
trustees to revest the property in the grantors, and therefore the settlors were
not taxable under Section 166; that John Stuart was not taxable under Sections 22(a) and 167; and that Douglas Stuart was taxable on the trust income
actually used for the support of his minor children. 7 The Supreme Court, three
justices dissenting, (1) held that the trustees had no power under Illinois law
to revest the corpus or income in the settlors, s (2) remanded the John Stuart
trusts to the Board of Tax Appeals for a determination as to their taxability
under Sections 22(a) and 167, and (3) held that all the income of the Douglas
Stuart trusts was taxable to the settlor.
1. As a general rule, the settlor of a trust may not be taxed on the income
of the trust. Under Sections 161, 162, and 163 of the Internal Revenue Code,
a trust is treated as a separate entity for tax purposes. The trustee pays the
tax if the income is accumulated and held for future distribution, while the
.beneficiary is taxed if the income is distributed to him or is credited to his
account.9 If, however, the settlor in substance is regarded as remaining the
owner of the corpus of the trust by virtue of a power held by him and/or by
one without a "substantial adverse interest" to revest the corpus of the trust
in the settlor,' ° or has retained interests in the income of the trust,"' he is
taxable on the income of the trust under Sections 166 and 167 respectively.
The income of the trust may also be taxed to the settlor under Section 22(a)
5

Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 169, 63 Sup. Ct. 140, 148 (1942).
642 B.T.A. 1421 (1940).
7124 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
SAil the trusts were created in Illinois and they provided that they were to be governed
by Illinois law. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the Illinois law would
govern. The minority assumed that it would. The split in the Court was caused by
divergent views on the taxpayer's burden of proving the applicable Illinois law. The
majority of the Court held that there had to be a finding of the ultimate fact of the law
and that the determination of the circuit court of appeals satisfied this burden. The
majority gave three reasons for this decision: (1) Without a definite conviction of error,
the Supreme Court will not reverse a judgment of the circuit court; (2) the Supreme
Court should not become a court of first instance for determining local law; and (3) the
circuit court is experienced in Illinois law and there is no reason for preferring the view
of the Board of Tax Appeals to that of the circuit court of appeals hearing Illinois cases.
The majority denied that the taxpayer had to demonstrate 'clearly and convincingly"
the applicable state law. The minority of the Court felt that the taxpayer contesting a
deficiency assessment assumes the burden of showing in point of law as well as of fact
that the tax is unlawfully assessed, and that the determination of the circuit court did
not9 fulfill this burden.
See 6 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION (1942) § 36.07 for an excellent
of the general rule. For a'more detailed statement, see id. c. 36.
statement
0
' This is the test prescribed by U. S. Treas. Reg. 103 § 19.166-1, as amended by T. D.
5194, 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 62, for taxation under § 166.
"XThis is the test prescrcibed by U. S. Treas. Reg. 103 § 19.167-1(b); as amended by
T. D. 5194, 1942-2 Cum. BuLL. 62 for taxation under § 167.
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if, after the establishment of the trust, he has retained such
2 control of the trust
that he might be regarded as the owner of the corpus.'
In remanding the John Stuart trusts, the Supreme Court clarified to some
extent the criteria to be used in determining who is to be taxed for the income
of a trust under Section 22(a). In Helvering v. Clifford,13 the Court considered that three features were important in determining this question: (1)
The short duration of the trust; (2) the fact that the wife of the settlor was
the beneficiary; and (3) the retention of control over the corpus by the settlor.
Within two years after this decision, nearly two hundred cases variously applying the Clifford doctrine were decided by the lower federal courts."4 The principal case sets forth four factors which the Board of Tax Appeals was to,
consider in determining the tax status of the John Stuart trusts. 15 Two features which indicated that the settlor was taxable were (1) his control as
settlor over the stock constituting the trust res, and (2) the close relationship
of the settlor to the trustees. Factors pointing toward a contrary conclusion
were (3) the broad powers of management vested in the trustees even though
they did not have a "substantial adverse interest," and (4) the impossibility
of reversion of the corpus to the settlor. Both the Clifford case and the instant
decision consider retention of control of the trust res by the settlor and the
family relationship of the settlor to the trustees or the beneficiary as indicative
of tax liability of the settlor. The instant case points out, however, that the
normal desire of a parent to provide for his children is not of itself a sufficient
basis for taxation.' The third feature of the Clifford case, the short-term trust
followed by a reversion of the trust res to the settlor, is not present in the
instant case. Thus that element is not a conclusive factor in determining tax
liability, but since the impossibility of reversion of the corpus to the settlor
is a factor tending to show that the settlor is not taxable, it would seem that
12The Supreme Court reviewed the general principles underlying this rule in considering the tax status of the respective trusts under Sections 22(a) and 167. Section 22(a)
indicates the intention of Congress to tax incomes to the fullest extent of its constitutional power. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S.-331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554 (1940) ; Douglas v.
Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935). The test of taxability is economic gain
realized or realizable by the taxpayer although the taxpayer need not actually receive the
gain. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579, 61 Sup. Ct. 759 (1941) ; Helvering v. Horst,
311 U. S. 112, 61 Sup. Ct. 144 (1940) ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122, 61 Sup. Ct.
149 (1940). This economic gain may be received through the control of a trust so
complete that the settlor is regarded as the owner of its income. Helvering v. Clifford,
supra. The'line. between gifts of income producing property and gifts of income from
property over which the donor remains the owner for all practical purposes will be left
to repeated adjudication. Harrison v. Schaffner, supra. For a general discussion of the
theory, see MAGILL, THE ImPAcT OF FEDERAL TAXES (1943) 44-72.
U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554 (1940).
13309
14Erxvin N. Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate, and Gift
Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers (1942) 56 HAmv. L. Rxv. 337.
For an excellent discussion and classification of the many decisions under Helvering v.
Clifford see, Edmund V. Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The Evolution5 of the Clifford Doctrine (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 213.
16 Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 169, 63 Sup. Ct. 140, 147 (1942).
I Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 168, 63 Sup. Ct. 140, 147 (1942).
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the duration of a trust will continue to be influential in tax questions.' 7 The
principal case indicates that none of the elements stressed in the Clifford case
is decisive they are to be considered in their cumulative effect when determining the settlor's tax liability under Section 22(a).18
2. In holding that all of the income of the Douglas Stuart trusts for his
minor children was taxable to the settlor under Section 167, the Supreme Court
departed from precedent. It was considered settled that the settlor of a trust
for the support, maintenance, and education of his minor children, whom he
was obligated to support, was taxable under Section 167 but the extent of his
liability formerly depended on the facts of each case.1 9 Where the settlor
retained the discretion to use all or part of the income of the trust for the
support and maintenance of his child, all the income of the trust was taxable
to the settlor whether or not he used it for the support of the child.2 0 When,
however, the discretion as to what part of the income of the trust should be
applied to the maintenance and education of a minor child was lodged in a
trustee or trustees, the settlor was taxable only on the income actually used
for the support of the child. 21 The Supreme Court, in effect, overruled the
distinction made by these earlier decisions on the ground that the mere possibility of the use of the income of the trust to discharge the parental obligation
to support was sufficient to bring the entire income of trusts of this type within
the scope of Section 167.22 In making this change in the law, the Court was
careful to point out that tlhe decision does not cover the application of Section
167 to cases in which the wife as trustee or beneficiary of a trust created by
her husband uses the income of the trust for family purposes.3
-

17 Williamson v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 489 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943).
ISMAGILL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 61; 6 MERTE S, op. cit. s pra note 9, at § 37.17,
p. 373, fn. 68; 6 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1943 Cum. Pock.
Supp.) § 37.17.
,
196 MERTENS, op. cit. supra rote 9, at § 37.21 has a detailed 4ummary of the law as it
existed prior to the instant case.
20Pyeatt
v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 774 (1939).
21
WolCott v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 1151 (1940)
Black v. Commissioner, 36
B. T. A. 346 (1937). There was acquiescence in the result by the general counsel.
General
Counsel's Memorandum 18972, 1937-2 Cumt. BULL. 231, 233.
22
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 170, 63 Sup. Ct. 140, 149 (1942). One writer
predicted tfiis holding. MAGILL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 66.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue has announced, however, that it will not apply the
rule of Helverhtg v. Stuart for taxable years ending before December 31, 1942, provided
certain conditions are met. General Counsel's Memorandum 23722, 4 Prentice-Hall 1943
Fed. Tax Serv.I1 66,199.
23The Supreme Court said: "We are not here appraising the application of § 167 to
cases where a wife is the trustee or beneficiary of the funds which may be used for the
family benefit. Cf. Suhr v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 283, 285 with Altinaier v. Colnmissioner, 116 F. (2d) 162 and Fulham v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 916." In the
Altmaier and the Fulham cases the wife of the settlor had the power, as trustee, to
revoke the trusts. It was held that the wife did not have a "substantial adverse interest."
But compare Raoul H. Fleischimann,40 B. T. A. 672 (1939), where it was held that a
wife, who has minor sons of a former marriage whom she is obligated to support, and
has the power, as trustee, to use the income of a trust for the support of these children
has a "substantial adverse interest." Mertens suggests that the question whether or not
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The Supreme Court did not have to consider the tax liability of a grantor
of a trust for the benefit of his minor children when there' was a trustee with a
"substantial adverse interest." One writer concludes that the Supreme Court
apparently recognized that the grantor would have been taxable only on the
income actually received by the child in such a situation. 24 Since the existence
of a trustee with a "substantial adverse interest" is largely a question of fact
depending on the individual case,2 5 past decisions are not too important. A
court of equity-assuming that the trust could only be terminated by a court
-does not have a "substantial adverse interest." 26 A b.are legal interest, that
possessed by a trustee, is not such an interest.2 7 A beneficiary who was entitled
to only $100 out of an annual trust income of $8,000 does not have a "substantial adverse interest. '2 8 When a family trust is created, the arrangement
will be closely scrutinized to determine whether the interest of others is substantial and adverse.29 The trend is to narrow the meaning of "substantial
adverse interest" and30to exclude adverse interests which were formerly regarded as substantial.
This decision does not vary the legal obligations of the settlor of a trust.
They are determined by 'local law and, therefore, may vary from state to
state.3 1 The following are a few examples of what have been held to be legal
obligations. The debts of a person are legal liabilities.32 A father is obligated
33
to provide for the support, maintenance, and education of his minor children,
34
The mother
but there is no-similar obligation to support minor stepchildren.
of minor children ordinarily has no obligation to support them if the father is
a member of a family has a "substantial adverse interest" depends on the facts of each
case. 6 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 37.13, p. 359.
In the Suhr case the wife of the settlor was a beneficiary and used part of the income
to support her child, but it was held that the settlor husband was not taxable. Mertens

concludes "Where the trust income is payable to the grantor's wife without restriction
as to the use thereof, and the wife uses part of the income for the support and maintenance of herself and children although there is no agreement that the income should
be2 so
used, the trust income is not taxable to the grantor." Id. at § 37.21.
4
MONTGomERY,

FEDERAL TAXES

ON

ESTATES,

TRUSTS AND

GIFTS 1942-43 (1943)

194, 209.

256 MERTENS, op. cit. szupraJ note 9, at § 37.13.
26 Silverthau v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 242 (D. C. D. Conn. 1938).
27

Morton v. Commissioner, 109 F. (2d) 47 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). See also U. S. Treas.
Reg. 103 § 19.166-1, as amended by T. D. 5194 (Dec. 8, 1942).
28May v. United States, Prentice-Hall 1940 Fed. Tax Serv. 1162, 917 (D. C. W. D.
Pa., 1940) on appeal.
296 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 37.13.
3o1bid.
31
Montgomery, op. cit. mpra note 24, at 195. Interesting examples of the difficulty of

proving state law are found in Helvering v. Fitch,309 U. S. 149, 60 Sup. Ct. 427 (1940),
and Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784 (1940). The instant case repretwo views on the taxpayer's burden of proving local law. See note 8 supra.
sents
S2 Helvering v. Blumenthal, 296 U. S. 552, 56 Sup. Ct. 305 (1935).
33
Helvering v. Stokes, 296 U. S. 551, 56 Sup. Ct. 308 (1935) ; Ingraham v. Commissioner,
119 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941).
34
Fleischmann v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 672 (1939), appeal dismissed by agreement, (C. C. A. 2d, May 12, 1942).
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35
If, however, the mother is divorced
living and capable of supporting them.
to support her children, she would be
duty
the
her
on
places
decree
and the
36
A husband is responsible for the support
under a legal obligation to them.
37
converse is not true except in unusual
the
but
and maintenance of his wife,
situations.38 Formerly, the husband's liability for the support and maintenance
of his divorced wife was such an obligation39if the divorce decree placed him
under a "continuing obligation" of support, but this rule has recently been
40
Depending on state law, a person may be under a duty
changed by statute.
'father, mother, brother, sister, and
to support various poor rkelatives, e.g., his 41
others incapable of supporting themselves.
The result of the holding that the mere possibility of using the trust income
for the support, maintenance, and education of the minor children of the settlor
is sufficient to make him taxable on all the income is not clear. The decision
will avoid the difficulty encountered under the ,former rule of determining
how much was expended on the support, education, and maintenance of a
42
Difficulties of a similar nature will arise, however, under the
minor child.
holding of the Stuart case. Assuming that the trust income is not taxable tp
the settlor under Section 22(a), how much income will be attributed to the
settlor of a trust for his children when some are adults and some minors?
Likewise, what will be the result when there is a trust for a minor child and
he reaches maturity during the tax year? Will tlhe holding of the instant case
be extended to all cases where the trust income may be, but is not, used to
discharge a legal obligation of the settlor? Under the theory of the instant
case, it seems that the holding will be so extended. Will the intentions of the
settlor in this field still be regarded? Formerly, if payments were made to a
the
person to-whom the settlor owed a legal obligation, some courts held that
trust
the
under
payments
the
that
intended
he
settlor was not taxed unless 43
One writer concludes that the decision of the
were to satisfy the obligation.
could
instant case does not affect this principle since no part of the income
answers
the
Unfortunately
obligation."
his
of
settlor
the
release
be used to
to these questions must be left to future adjudication.
E. T. Brown, Jr.
35
Sharp
6

v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 336 (a) (1940).
3 Cf. Fleischmann v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 672 (1939), appeal di.nissed by agreeinent, (C. C. A. 2d, May 12, 1942).
37Commissioner v. Betts, 123 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941).
1942).
3SCommissioner v. Jergens, 127 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 5th,
39
Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935).
120(c)
4OBy the new Section 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, added by Section
and may be
of the Revenue Act of 1942, alimony is taxable income to the divorced wife
deducted by the divorced husband.
op. cit. SUpra note 24, at 196 gives examples of this.
41MONTGO-MERY,
of
42 This difficulty might be exaggerated to some extent as the parent had the burden
C. A. 7th, 1941).
his expenditures. Stuart v. Commissioner, 124 F. (2d) 772 (C.
proving
81 F. (2d)
43
jones x. Norris, 122 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) ; Shanley v. Bowers,
FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION
OF
LAW
THE
MERTENS,
Compare
1936).
2d,
A.
C.
13 ( C.
AND GIFTs 1942(1942) § 37.21 and MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS
246-247.
(1936)
INCOME
TAXABLE
MAGILL,
with
191,
43 (1943)
44Montgomery, op. cit. supra note 43, at 210.

